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This thesis examines the impact of the Group of Twenty regulatory reform program 
on the over the counter derivatives market. The Group of Twenty started a reform 
program in 2009 with the aim of building a more secure market for over the counter 
derivatives. The objective of this thesis is to show how the principles of the regulatory 
reform program were implemented into working regulation within the European Un-
ion.  
 
The thesis is made up of a theory section and an empirical section. The theory section 
consists of established finance literature. The main focus is on literature dealing with 
the structure of financial markets and on the theory of derivatives. A large part of the 
theory section is dedicated to the reasons and causes behind the recent financial crisis.  
 
The empirical section of the study is based on qualitative research methods. The em-
pirical material is gathered from countless articles, surveys and letters.  
 
The thesis shows that the newly created derivatives regulation of the European Union 
is not fully in line with the principles outlined by the Group of Twenty. The research 
showed that the implementation of the regulation has not been a total success. The 
implementation has been plagued by rush, technical problems, political motivations 
and mistakes made in past legislation. Some fear that certain parts of the European 
Union regulation are threatening to undermine the original Group of Twenty com-
mitment to bring safety and transparency to the derivatives market.  
 
However, this study was done at a time when the European regulation was not yet fully 
implemented. The regulatory work is an ongoing process and it is expected that the 
problems noticed in this thesis will be solved at a later time. 
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1 Introduction 
In today's globalized world, where new market opportunities arise and competition 
increases, companies need to develop abilities that enable them to quickly adapt to 
changing market conditions. One way to do so is to master the use of derivatives. De-
rivatives can be used speculatively to seek returns or more cautiously to seek protection 
from financial risks. The financial flexibility that derivatives provide was a contributing 
factor in the events leading to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
The financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 showed great weakness in the 
capability of banks and other market participants to handle financial and economic 
distress. The crisis demonstrated that further transparency and regulation of over the 
counter derivatives and market participants was needed in order to limit excessive and 
complex risk taking. It is widely considered to be necessary to reduce systemic risk cre-
ated by derivatives transactions, markets and practices. (Bank of International Settle-
ments 2013b) 
 
As a weapon to fight systemic risk, the Group of Twenty started a reform program in 
2009 with the aim of building a more secure market for over the counter derivatives. 
The Group of Twenty is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 
20 large economies. The reform program includes four elements.  
 All standardized OTC derivatives should be traded on exchanges or electronic 
platforms, where appropriate.  
 All standardized OTC derivatives should be cleared through central counterpar-
ties (CCPs).  
 OTC derivative transactions should be reported to trade repositories.  
 Non-centrally cleared derivative transactions should be subject to higher capital 
requirements.  
(Bank of International Settlements 2013b) 
 
Local financial authorities are responsible for implementing regulation that complies 
with above mentioned principles. In the United States this regulation is part of the 
  
2 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd – Frank). In 
Europe the regulation is written in European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR). 
 
In this thesis the author studies how the principles laid out by the Group of Twenty 
have been translated to actions by the European Union financial market regulators.  
 
1.1 Research questions and scope 
The research question of the thesis is: How has the derivatives regulation changed the 
derivatives marketplace in Europe after the financial crisis and credit crunch? The aim 
is to study both the actual changes in regulation and the actions the actors on the de-
rivatives market have had to take to ensure compliance. The research aims to outline 
the underlying reasons for the financial crisis and the motivation from which the regu-
lation was born.  
 
The research is focusing on changes in the regulation within European Union. Alt-
hough the European regulation has not been in place for long, it should already now 
be possible to study how the market has initially reacted to it. The thesis focuses on 
regulation that has a direct impact on operational issues and regulation governing capi-
tal requirement is out scoped. The regulation mandating that all standardized OTC 
derivatives should be traded on exchanges is still being prepared in European Union 
and is not expected to enter into force before late 2016 or early 2017. Therefore, it is 
not in scope for this thesis. 
 
1.2 Thesis background and objectives 
The author of the study has worked with derivatives at Nordea Bank Finland since 
January 2007. He has worked for the last five years in a derivatives business develop-
ment unit. The development work has consisted of taking part in projects and devel-
opment tasks mainly related to post trade operations. During this time, no other single 
event has had as much impact on the derivatives marketplace as the new regulation 
stemming from the financial crisis. It is worth mentioning that during the last year the 
new regulation has been part of the author’s every working day. Working with deriva-
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tives for a long time has given the author a good understanding on the magnitude of 
the changes that the regulation has brought and will bring in the future.  
 
The original objective of the thesis was to perform a study of the new tasks and pro-
cess needed in Nordea Bank Finland to comply with the new derivatives regulation. 
After working with the real life regulatory tasks, the author felt that studying things 
that he already knew was not interesting. 
 
Therefore, objectives of the study is not to list the things that Nordea Bank Finland or 
any other financial institution had to do in order to be compliant with new regulation 
but to understand the reasons why the regulation was put in place in the first place. For 
the author it is much more important to understand the reasons and goals behind the 
regulation than to make a list of new processes that had to be implemented at Nordea 
Bank Finland in order comply with the regulation. For the author, understanding the 
regulation is paramount for being able to succeed at work. Therefore, this is not a 
study on Nordea Bank Finland but a study on the regulation itself.  
 
The conclusions of the study can be used in internal regulatory documentation of 
Nordea Bank Finland but the study is not commissioned by Nordea Bank Finland. 
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The first chapter of this thesis outlines the background and research question of the 
thesis. Second and third chapters explain how financial markets work. Fourth chapter 
introduces different types of financial risk types. The differences between exchange 
traded derivatives and over the counter derivatives are explained in chapter five. Sixth 
chapter explains the role securitization and systemic risk played in the credit crunch. 
Research methodology is explained in the seventh chapter. European derivatives regu-
lation is explained in detail in the eighth chapter. Conclusions on the research can be 
found from the ninth chapter. 
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2 Financial intermediation 
In order to understand the causes and effects of the recent financial crisis, it is im-
portant to understand how and why the financial markets work as they do.  
 
At any given time it is possible to see two distinct types of economic agents within an 
economy: Those that have surplus funds due to their income being higher than their 
expenses and those that require more funds to finance their expenses which exceed 
their income. (Pilbeam 2010, 27) 
 
The process of transferring money from economic agents with surplus funds to eco-
nomic agents willing to utilize those excess funds is called financial intermediation. In 
order to understand financial intermediation it is necessary to understand that econom-
ic agents have very different financial positions, investment, business and financial 
needs. To cater for these needs there is a wide range of financial instruments and fi-
nancial intermediaries. (Pilbeam 2010, 27) 
 
Excess funds in an economy are transferred between different types of economic 
agents by a financial intermediary by means of the issuance of a financial security. Fi-
nancial securities are an asset to one of the economic parties and a liability to the other. 
The financial intermediaries play a crucial role between the economic agents facilitating 
the transfer of funds. (Pilbeam 2010, 27) 
 
Agents with surplus may be government agencies, individuals or companies which all 
have a variety of motives to save surplus funds. Companies save money to finance fu-
ture investments and ordinary people save money in order to finance future purchases. 
Generally surplus agents want financial securities that offer them a good mixture of 
liquidity, return and protection against rising inflation. (Pilbeam 2010, 28) 
 
Deficit agents can be individuals, companies or government agencies with varying rea-
sons to borrow funds. Individuals often wish to borrow funds to finance expenditure 
that temporarily exceeds their income, like a car or a house. Companies wish to borrow 
funds to finance investments. And as investments take a long time to yield profits, they 
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aim to get long-term financing. There is a high level of uncertainty in the return on 
investments so companies aim to acquire financing as equity. Equity holders are com-
pensated for their funds only if the investment of the company yields profit. (Pilbeam 
2010, 28) 
 
It is then clear that excess funds from surplus agents need to be transferred to deficit 
agents. This is done with financial securities. (Pilbeam 2010, 28) 
 
2.1 Financial security 
A financial security is a legal claim to receive a cash flow in the future. The terms fi-
nancial instrument and financial security are interchangeable. Each financial instrument 
is issued by an economic agent (issuer) that agrees to make future cash flows to an in-
vestor that is the legal owner of the issued instrument. (Pilbeam 2010, 28) 
 
It is possible to distinguish two types of financial instruments: debt and equity claims. 
The investor of a debt claim has a predetermined cash claim to receive back the invest-
ed amount and interest return on the invested amount. The interest rate on the claim 
may be fixed or floating. The investor of an equity claim only has rights to a cash pay-
ment when the investors of debt claims have been paid. Therefore, an equity investor 
has no guarantee that any return will be paid on the equity claim. The payments of an 
equity claim are called dividends. (Pilbeam 2010, 28) 
 
It is important to understand the difference between debt and equity. The investors of 
debt instruments usually face a low risk compared to the investors of equity. Debt in-
strument investors are often banks and debt issuers are companies. The investing 
banks face a fairly low risk of a default as the loan contract is often secured against an 
asset owned by the issuing company. If the company fails to meet its legal obligations, 
it is possible for the investor to liquidate the asset and gain some of the invested 
amount back. In comparison, equity investors have much more risk as the incoming 
dividend cash flows and the future value of the equity are uncertain. Therefore, the 
return on the equity claim is difficult to predict as it is determined by the profitability 
of the issuing company. (Pilbeam 2010, 29)  
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The difference between debt and equity determines which kind of financing a company 
wishes to acquire for their investments. As it is inherently risky for a company to make 
investments, they tend to prefer acquiring financing with equity since dividends need 
to be paid out only if the investment yields profit. Issued debt needs to be paid out 
regardless of the success of the investment. On the other hand companies often ac-
quire financing with debt instruments. This is done if a company finds that the risk of 
the investment failing is low or the price of debt financing is attractive. (Pilbeam 2010, 
29) 
 
2.2 Financial intermediaries 
The marketplace where economic agents and financial intermediaries operate is called 
financial markets. Financial assets are being traded and exchanged to other financial 
assets, money, commodities or services. Financial intermediaries are tasked with circu-
lating funds from surplus agents to deficit agents i.e. transferring funds from those that 
wish to save funds to those that wish to borrow funds. In doing so, financial interme-
diaries perform several economic functions. (Pilbeam 2010, 30) 
 
2.2.1 Maturity transformation 
Economic agents with surplus funds usually wish to have their invested funds available 
with a short notice. Deficit agents on the other hand wish to borrow funds with a 
much longer-term. A financial intermediary like a commercial bank accepts investor’s 
funds on a short-term basis and transfers these liabilities into long term assets like 
loans. This process of converting liabilities to assets is called maturity transformation. 
The reason why commercial banks are able to perform this is because they are in busi-
ness with a large volume of depositors and lenders. This enables financial institutions 
to predict their outflow and inflow of funds and lower their needed liquidity reserves. 
(Pilbeam 2010, 30-31)  
 
This process is vital to the economy as it proves both types of agents a greater choice 
in how to borrow and save funds. There would be less exchange between surplus and 
deficit agents if the financial intermediaries did not exist. Since the short-term liquidity 
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needs of the surplus agents would fail to meet the long term financing requirements of 
deficit agents. The absence of financial intermediaries would force deficit agents to 
compensate the loss of liquidity to surplus agents by paying a higher rate of interest. 
The higher rate would induce the surplus agents to lend their funds for a longer period. 
(Pilbeam 2010, 31) 
 
2.2.2 Risk transformation 
Financial intermediaries play a role in balancing the willingness of economical agents to 
take risks. Agents looking for way to invest their excess funds usually have a high pref-
erence for safety in their investment. Surplus agents might require a full capital protec-
tion for their investment. More adventurous surplus holders can accept a certain level 
of risk assuming the prospective return on the investment exceeds the level of per-
ceived risk. This is in stark contrast to the deficit agents who wish to borrow funds to 
finance their inherently risky investments. A surplus holder could in theory lend excess 
funds directly to a deficit agent but this arrangement would fully expose the surplus 
agent to the risk of the deficit holder defaulting on the loan. (Pilbeam 2010, 31) 
 
Financial intermediaries play a role in transforming low risk requirements of savers into 
meeting the high risk needs of investors. A financial intermediary like a commercial 
bank can combine funds from many surplus agents to be lent to deficit agents. A 
commercial bank can limit the risks of lending money to deficit agents by making a 
large number of small loans compared to making a small number of large loans. In 
addition commercial banks loan funds to all sectors of the economy so they are not 
dependent on the success of individual companies or even sectors of economy. Finan-
cial intermediaries are also competent in analyzing and pricing the risk inherent in lend-
ing funds. (Pilbeam 2010, 31-32) 
 
Financial intermediaries are obligated to maintain some ratio of capital to their asset 
portfolio. This ratio rises based on the risk level of the asset portfolio. Economic 
agents who have invested in financial intermediaries are protected by the capital base 
of the intermediary. This capital base provides a barrier for the investors’ savings 
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should the activities the intermediary take incur significant losses. (Pilbeam 2010, 31-
32) 
 
2.2.3 Liquidity provision 
One of the main tasks of financial intermediaries is to provide liquidity to the financial 
market. Surplus agents need a good ability to change their investments in financial as-
sets into money at a fair price, low cost and with a short notice. Most savings products 
like bonds have a long term to maturity and in the case of equities no term to maturity. 
As surplus agents have a high need for liquidity they would not be willing to invest in 
these assets unless they have the possibility to change their investments to money at a 
short notice. (Pilbeam 2010, 32) 
 
Financial intermediaries and markets work to bring potential sellers and buyers of an 
asset together. Functioning markets enable those that wish to sell an asset to obtain the 
best possible market price. In case of direct cash deposits to financial intermediaries, 
the surplus agents require an instant access to their deposited funds. As the financial 
intermediaries are good at predicting the incoming and outgoing deposit flows, they are 
able to provide liquidity without holding large cash balances in relation to their total 
deposits. (Pilbeam 2010, 32) 
 
2.2.4 Reduction of costs 
Financial intermediaries benefit from economies of scale. They are in business with 
countless surplus and deficit agents. The scale of their operation makes it possible to 
create standard products. By reducing the cost of search, contracting and information 
costs, financial intermediaries reduce the borrowing costs of deficit agents while simul-
taneously reducing the costs and risk of surplus agents. (Pilbeam 2010, 33) 
 
3 Financial markets 
There are many different types of financial markets that all cater for different needs. 
Money markets deal in short term assets that are easily transformed into cash. Securi-
ties markets enable the raising of new capital and the trading of bonds and existing 
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listed or non-listed shares. Foreign exchange markets act as a place where different 
currencies are trade for one another. Derivatives markets are where future obligations 
and options to buy and sell assets are traded (Pilbeam 2010, 33) 
 
Markets can be divided to primary and secondary markets. On primary markets new 
securities are traded whilst secondary markets are used to trade existing securities. The 
main concern for primary markets is to raise new funds to issuers from borrowers. 
This is done in various ways like selling new shares, issuing state treasury bills, com-
mercial bills and bonds. Secondary markets are the marketplaces for financial securities 
that have been issued earlier. This means that the issuer of the share receives no funds 
for the sale of the security on the secondary market. Trades done on the secondary 
markets are nevertheless important to the issuer of the share as they determine the val-
ue of the issuing company. Secondary markets are also important for investors as they 
provide them with the all-important liquidity and the possibility to sell or buy securities 
outside of the primary market. (Pilbeam 2010, 34) 
 
3.1 Pricing of assets 
The ability of an effectively working financial market to price assets on a continuous 
basis is one of its key purposes. The price of a financial security on the market is the 
level on which buyer and a seller are willing to execute a trade. If the amount of agents 
willing to buy an asset exceeds the amount of agents willing to sell the asset, the price 
of the asset rises. Consequently if the amount of willing sellers exceeds the buyers, the 
price of the asset fails. (Pilbeam 2010, 36) 
 
“According to the efficient market hypothesis the market price of a financial asset will 
quickly move to reflect all available information. This means that buyers and sellers can 
be confident that the price they trade at is fair and reasonable.” (Pilbeam 2010, 36) 
 
3.2 Discipline function 
Financial markets help to ensure that companies and governments act with sound fi-
nancial discipline. The existence of financial markets that trade on the debt and equity 
of companies and governments forces them to make financial decisions with the mar-
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kets in mind. Companies need to consider the reaction that the markets will have on 
investments and other actions. If the markets feel that the actions taken by the compa-
ny are financially unsound, the company will face either higher costs of acquiring fi-
nancing from the market or decrease in the price of the share and in turn decrease in 
the value of the company. (Pilbeam 2010, 36) 
 
3.3 Participants in financial markets 
Modern financial markets are comprised of a variety of different types of participants. 
These include commercial and investment banks, financial institutions, investment 
companies, individuals, pension and insurance funds, multinationals, local and central 
government and international institutions. All these participants have different motiva-
tions for their actions on the financial market. (Pilbeam 2010, 37) 
 
It is possible to separate market participants based on their motivation. The buying or 
selling of financial security in order to reduce or eliminate existing risk is called hedg-
ing. Arbitrageurs aim to make riskless guaranteed profit by exploiting price anomalies 
in the market place. Speculators are willing to take risks in order to make profit. Specu-
lators open a position in a financial security hoping that changes in the price of the 
security result in positive revenue. (Pilbeam 2010, 37-38) 
 
Financial market would not work as efficiently without brokers. They are intermediar-
ies between investors. They act on the market on behalf of investor and charge a fee 
for their services. It is their task to bring hedgers, arbitrageurs and speculators together. 
(Pilbeam 2010, 38) 
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4 Financial Risk 
Financial risk can defined as the extent to which an organization or individual may in-
cur losses as a result of an adverse movement in market rates or price in a certain fi-
nancial security. As a broad statement one can say that investors require compensation 
for assuming risk. The riskier the investment the more return the investor requires to 
be compensated as a return for carrying the risk. The risk of an investment can be 
measured as the volatility of its returns to the investor over the volatility of the overall 
financial market. The objective of financial risk management is to reduce the volatility 
of the return on investment. (Cooper 2004, 1-2) 
 
4.1 Financing risk 
Financing risk is the risk that a company may no longer be able or afford acquiring 
financing from its chosen debt markets. High cost of financing decreases the amount 
that can be paid out to investors as dividends. The realization of financial risk may 
have devastating impacts on a company. If the risk materializes it means that the com-
pany may no longer pursue its chosen strategy. This is consequence is particularly true 
if the strategy of the company includes expansion through organic growth and invest-
ments. Re-financing of existing debt can also become impossible. (Cooper 2004, 3-4) 
 
Financing risk may be realized from breaches of company’s loan agreements as a result 
of inappropriate financial structures. Or the risk can materialize because of a failed fi-
nancing strategy. A company might fail diversifying its sources of funding or the com-
pany might have a high proportion of its financing maturing at the same time. (Cooper 
2004, 4) 
 
4.2 Liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk rises from a company’s insufficient financial resources to cope with the 
day to day fluctuations in working capital and cash flows. This risk needs to be ad-
dressed even when the financing risk from long-term financing is under control. 
(Cooper 2004, 6) 
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Failing to control liquidity risk, results in a number of adverse effects. A company 
might have insufficient liquid funds to pay its liabilities when they are due. This result 
in penalty costs, loss of reputation and even bankruptcy. Failures to notice the need for 
liquidity might force the use of cash deposits and short-term borrowings at the same 
time. This result in expenses as the rate received on the deposit is lower than the rate 
paid on the short term financing. (Cooper 2004, 6) 
 
4.3 Transaction risk 
Transaction risk is caused by changes in foreign exchange markets. A company is ex-
posed to transaction risk if it has future foreign currency receipts or payments. The 
changes in exchange rates, between the moment when the payment obligation has oc-
curred and the actual payment, can have effect on the revenue of a company. Transac-
tion risk is usually short term and is typically the result of a company being obligated to 
pay foreign currency to an overseas supplier. (Cooper 2004, 7) 
 
4.4 Translation risk 
Translation risk is a concern for companies with overseas subsidiaries. The domestic 
currency value of a subsidiary’s assets and liabilities change when the foreign exchange 
rate between the domestic and overseas currency fluctuates. Also the revenue generat-
ed in the subsidiary fluctuates. These changes can have substantial effect on the finan-
cial result of the company. (Cooper 2004, 7) 
 
4.5 Economic risk 
A company can have exposure to foreign exchange market based economic risk even 
in currencies that they themselves do not have business in. A company exporting from 
the Eurozone to USA has transaction risk in EUR/USD exchange rate and economic 
risk between USD and other currencies. Changes in the rate between USD and other 
currencies can give competitive advantage to non-Eurozone companies. (Cooper 2004, 
8) 
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4.6 Interest rate risk 
All companies with borrowings or deposits are exposed to interest rate risk. The 
changes in interest rates change the cost of floating rate financing. In turn the rate 
changes also affect the return on cash deposits. (Cooper 2004, 8) 
 
4.7 Credit Risk 
Credit risk arises from the possibility that counterparties in derivatives contracts or 
borrowers default. (Hull 2012, 521) Credit risk and ways to protect from it are ex-
plained in chapter 5.3. 
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5 Derivatives market 
Derivatives such as futures, forwards, swaps and options are used to transfer financial 
risk from one entity in the economy to another. (Hull 2012, 180) 
 
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is derived from the value of other 
underlying variables. Often the underlying variable is a price of some other financial 
instrument. Like in case of stock options, the value of the derivative is dependent on 
the value of the underlying stock. Derivatives can also derive their value from other 
sources than financial instruments. The value of the derivative can be taken from for 
example the price of freight shipments or the price of electricity. (Hull 2012, 1) 
 
There are two types of derivatives markets: Exchange traded markets and over the 
counter markets. Exchange traded or so called listed derivatives are traded on multiple 
derivatives exchanges. Derivatives traded on exchanges are standardized contracts de-
fined by the exchange. (Hull 2012, 2-3) 
 
All derivatives trades are not done in an exchange. The largest trade volumes are in so 
called Over the Counter or OTC market. The OTC market allows the trade partici-
pants to negotiate a mutually attractive derivatives contract. Institutions are not forced 
to trade standard contracts like in an exchange. The downside of the OTC market is 
that the derivatives contract exposes the trade participants to credit risk.  (Hull 2012, 2-
3) 
 
Both the exchange traded and OTC markets have been criticized after the start of the 
credit crisis in 2007. As an outcome of the crisis, the regulation of both markets has 
increased. Financial institutions have higher capital requirements to cover for the risk 
they are taking. Institutions are also forced to pay more attention to their liquidity situ-
ation. (Hull 2012, 1-2) 
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5.1 Motives for using derivatives 
Hedgers use derivatives to protect themselves from future movements in market pric-
es. The key aspect of hedging is to reduce risk. This reduction is achieved by entering 
in to derivatives contracts that enable the hedger to know the exact price of an asset in 
a set time in the future. There is no guarantee that hedging provides a positive financial 
outcome. It just eliminates uncertainties about future prices. (Hull 2012, 11) 
 
Speculators aim to make profit on the market by opening a derivatives position. They 
either bet that the price of an asset goes up or they are betting that it goes down. (Hull 
2012, 13) 
 
Arbitrageurs try to gain riskless profit by simultaneously entering into multiple transac-
tions in similar underlying instruments in multiple markets. Their income is generated 
by brief price differences between the markets. (Hull 2012, 15) 
 
5.2 Futures contracts 
Futures contract is a legally binding agreement between two parties to sell or buy an 
asset for a certain price at a certain time in the future. Futures contracts are exchange 
traded derivatives. In order to make it possible to trade futures the exchange has speci-
fied certain standardized features to the derivatives contract. As a trade is done in an 
exchange, the trade parties do not know each other. The derivatives exchange provides 
a mechanism that guarantees both parties that the contract will be honored. Hence 
futures contracts are free of credit risk. (Hull 2012, 7) 
 
A seller of a futures contract has a short futures position and the buyer of the contract 
has a long futures position. The party that has the short position has agreed to physi-
cally deliver the underlying asset on a specified delivery month and delivery place to the 
holder of the long position. As a compensation for the physical asset, the short posi-
tion holder receives the futures price from the long position holder. The long position 
holder receives the physical asset from the short position holder. The actual physical 
delivery rarely happens as futures positions are closed out before the delivery time is 
reached. Closing out means; buying or selling an opposite but identical futures contract 
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as the original contract. The revenue from the futures contracts is determined by the 
price difference between the original and close out contracts. (Hull 2012, 23-24)  
 
The futures prices on the exchange are determined by the laws of supply and demand. 
If more market participants want to open a short position than a long position, the 
futures price goes down. If the reverse is true, the futures price goes up (Hull 2012, 7) 
 
The derivatives exchange specifies the details of the futures contract so that market 
participants know exactly what they are trading on. These specifications include a de-
tailed description of the asset. The details are at a very high level especially with com-
modities as there is big variance of different types of commodities. The exchange must 
specify how much of the asset is due to be delivered under one contract. The delivery 
place must be specified as the expenses of physical delivery, especially with commodi-
ties, can be significant. Delivery months and trading times must also be specified. (Hull 
2012, 24-26) 
 
5.2.1 Margining 
If two market participants would get in touch with each other and agreed to trade an 
asset for a certain price in the future, there would be a risk that one of the parties 
would not honor the contract. In doing so the party failing to honor the agreement is 
defaulting. One of the key reasons for trading in an exchange is to make sure that con-
tract defaults are avoided. This is done by market participants posting margin to the 
exchange. (Hull 2012, 27) 
 
When an investor opens a futures position in an exchange they are obligated to deposit 
(post) a so called initial margin to a margin account with the broker who has executed 
their trade in the exchange. The broker in turn posts the margin to the derivatives ex-
change. The initial margin is determined based on the value of the futures contract at 
trade date. At the end of each banking day the amount on the margin account is ad-
justed to reflect the changes in the value of the futures contract.  If the price of the 
futures contract has moved favorably to the investor, the broker adds the difference 
between previous trading day’s closing price and today’s closing price to the margin 
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account of the investor. The broker has received the positive margin from the ex-
change. Investors with an opposite position in the same contract lose money on their 
margin account as their broker posts their margin to the exchange. The valuation of 
the futures position and the following transfer of margin is called marking to market 
(Hull 2012, 810). It makes sure that the gains and losses of each investor are honored 
every day. (Hull 2012, 27-29) 
 
The balance on the margin account changes based on the market price movements. 
The balance on the account can drop below the initial margin but if the margin amount 
drops below a set level called maintenance margin, the broker will issue a margin call to 
the investor requesting to post enough margin to reach the initial margin level. The 
extra funds are called variation margin. If the investor is unable to provide enough var-
iation margin, the broker will close out the investor’s futures position. (Hull 2012, 28) 
 
5.2.2 Clearing houses 
Clearing houses act as financial intermediaries in futures contracts. These clearing 
houses are operated by the derivatives exchanges. They guarantee the performance of 
contracts to parties of each futures contract. Clearing houses have members who post 
funds to the clearing house. Just like an individual investor needs to have a margin ac-
count with a broker, the broker needs to have a margin account with a clearing house 
member. Clearing house members need to in turn have a margin account in the clear-
ing house. The task of the clearing house is to keep track of the contracts of each 
member so they can daily calculate the positions for each member. (Hull 2012, 30) 
 
The whole purpose of the margining and clearing houses is to ensure that funds are 
immediately available to futures investors when they make a profit. (Hull 2012, 30) 
 
5.3 Forwards 
Forward contracts are traded in the over the counter derivatives market. It is an 
agreement to buy or sell an asset at a certain price at a certain time in the future. For-
ward contracts are traded directly between financial institutions or between a financial 
institution and one of its clients. One of the parties to a forward contract acquires a 
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long position and agrees to buy the underlying asset on a certain predefined price on a 
certain future date. The other party acquires a short position and agrees to sell the asset 
with the same terms. (Hull 2012, 5) The parties are free to agree on mutually agreeable 
terms for the forward trade. (Hull 2012, 3) 
 
A major difference between futures and forwards contracts is the fact that the cash or 
physical settlement on the forward contract is settled at the end of the contract. In 
comparison futures trades have daily settlements on the investor’s margin account. If 
an investor entered into two identical future and forward contracts, the profit or loss 
they experience is identical in amount but the futures cash flow is exchanged incremen-
tally during the whole maturity of the trade whereas the payment on the forward con-
tract is typically exchanged on the end date. (Hull 2012, 41-42) This means that for-
ward contracts have credit risk as the value of the contract is not settled between par-
ties daily. (Hull 2012, 41)  
 
5.4 Options 
Option contracts offer an inexpensive and flexible way to control economic risk or 
take on highly leveraged speculative financial exposure. Options enable risk to be 
transferred from one party that wishes to reduce its risk, to another party that is willing 
to take on the risk for a premium. Options are an attractive instrument especially for 
speculators as a small upfront premium payment can result in significant returns. 
(Pilbeam 2010, 359) 
 
Options can be traded on both exchange and over the counter markets. There are two 
types of options. A call or cap option gives the buyer of the option the right to buy the 
underlying asset at a certain date for a certain price. A put or floor option gives the 
buyer of the option the right to sell the underlying asset at a certain date for a certain 
price. The price in the option contract is called the strike price and the date is called the 
expiry or maturity date. (Hull 2012, 7) 
 
An option gives the buyer of an option, the right to do something but the buyer does 
not have to exercise this right. In comparison on forward and futures trades the trade 
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participants are obligated to perform certain actions. Entering into a forward or future 
contract is free but buying an option always requires an up-front premium payment. 
(Hull 2012, 194) 
 
The time when the buyer is allowed to exercise their right to buy or sell the underlying 
asset is determined by the option style. Typical options are either European or Ameri-
can. The buyer of an American option can exercise the option on any date before or 
including the expiry date whereas the buyer of a European option can exercise the op-
tion only on the expiry date. The option style has a major consequence on the profit 
and loss potential of the option. (Hull 2012, 194) 
 
A purchaser of a put or floor option is hoping that the price of the underlying asset 
goes down on the market. An investor might purchase a put option with a strike of 
EUR 70. If the price of the underlying asset falls below EUR 70, the investor can pur-
chase a cheaper asset from the market and sell the same asset to the seller of the option 
for the agreed price of EUR 70. The profit for the buyer is the difference between the 
strike price and the market price deducted with the paid premium. The loss for the 
seller is the opposite of the profit for the buyer. The seller of the option gains the pre-
mium as profit if the market price on the expiry date is higher than the strike. (Hull 
2012, 196). 
 
If a buyer of a put option believes the price of the underlying asset goes down, in 
comparison the buyer of a call or cap option believes the price will go up. The call op-
tion gives the buyer the possibility to purchase the underlying asset from the seller at 
an agreed price. If the market price of the asset rises above the strike of the option, the 
buyer of the option gains the difference between the market price and the option strike 
deducted with the option premium. (Hull 2012, 195) 
 
It is important to note that even when the option is in the money, i.e. the buyer is able 
to exercise the option; the option contract still might generate a net loss to the buyer. 
This happens when the price difference between the option and market price is smaller 
than the paid premium. (Hull 2012, 195) 
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5.5 Swaps 
The first swap contracts were agreed upon in the early 1980s. Since then, their im-
portance in the derivatives markets has grown significantly. A swap is an OTC agree-
ment between two entities to exchange cash flows in the future. The swap agreement 
specifies the date when the cash flows should be paid and how they should be calculat-
ed. Typically the cash flow calculation is based on a future value of an interest rate, 
foreign exchange rate, stock - or commodity price. The swap contract usually has cash 
flow payments on multiple future dates. (Hull 2012, 148) 
 
The reason for the existence of the swap market is that it enables companies to exploit 
arbitrage opportunities resulting from price differences in the credit market. There are 
a number of credit market imperfections that enable companies to obtain funding 
from the market at different rates of interest. (Pilbeam 2010, 408) Different companies 
are able to obtain floating and fixed rate funding from the market at different rates. A 
company having an absolute advantage on a floating market might want to swap float-
ing rate funding to fixed rate funding with another company that has absolute ad-
vantage on the fixed rate market. (Pilbeam 2010, 398-399) 
 
5.5.1 Plain Vanilla Interest Rate Swap or IRS 
The most common type of swap is a plain vanilla interest rate swap or IRS. In an IRS a 
company agrees to pay a cash flow equal to interest at a predetermined fixed rate on a 
notional principal for a predetermined time. In return the company receives interest at 
a floating market rate on the same notional principal for the same time. (Hull 2012, 
148) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a theoretical 3-year swap between two companies: Company A and 
Company B. Suppose that Company A agrees to pay Company B fixed interest rate of 
5% per annum on a principal of 10 million EUR. In return Company B pays Company 
A six month Euribor rate on the same principal. Company A is called the fixed rate 
payer and company B is called the floating rate payer. (Hull 2012, 149) 
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Figure 1. Interest rate swap  
 
The first swap payment would take place six months after the effective date of the 
swap contract. Assuming that the day count fraction on the agreement is ACT/360 
Company A would pay Company B 180/360*5%*1000000 = EUR 250 000,00 Com-
pany B would pay Company A interest on the 10 million principal at the 6 month Eu-
ribor rate prevailing 6 months prior to the payment date (rate fixing date). Assuming 
that the Euribor fixing rate was 4.2%, the floating rate payment would be 
180/360/4.2%*1000000 = EUR 210 000.00. In reality only the net difference between 
the payment amounts would be exchanged. In this case Company A would pay EUR 
40 000.00. In total there would be six payments on the swap. The fixed payment 
amount would remain the same but the floating payment amount would change based 
on the changes in the interest rate. (Hull 2012, 149) 
 
It begs the question: why would Company A want to enter into this kind of agreement? 
Figure 2 shows how Company A could use the swap to transform a floating rate loan 
into a fixed rate loan. Let us assume that Company A has borrowed 10 million EUR at 
six month Euribor plus 10 basis points. After they enter into a swap contract, they 
have in total three cash flows: 
1. Company A pays 6 month Euribor plus 10 basis point to its lender 
2. Company A receives 6 month Euribor from Company B 
3. Company A pays 5% fixed rate to Company B 
(Hull 2012, 151) 
 
These three cash flows net out to a fixed interest payment of 5,1%. (Hull 2012, 149) 
 
Figure 2. Using a swap to transform a liability 
Euribor 6 month
5 %
Company BCompany A
Euribor 6 month
5 %
Company BCompany A
Euribor 6 month +0,1%
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Company A could also use the swap to transform the nature of their asset. Figure 3 
illustrates how Company A could change an asset earning fixed rate of interest into and 
asset earning a floating rate of interest. Let us assume the company has purchased 10 
million EUR worth of bods that will provide them with an interest of 4.7% per annum. 
After the company enters into the swap contract they will have following three cash 
flows: 
1. Company A receives 4,7% on the bonds 
2. Company A receives 6 month Euribor from Company B 
3. Company A pays 5% to Company B 
(Hull 2012, 152) 
 
The cash flows net out to an interest rate inflow of Euribor minus 30 basis points. 
Company A has changed an asset earning 4,7% per annum to an asset earning Euribor 
minus 30 basis points. (Hull 2012, 152) 
 
 
Figure 3. Using a swap to transform an Asset 
 
5.5.2 Role of financial intermediaries in the swaps market 
Previous examples of two companies entering into and swap agreement in real life is 
highly unlikely. Companies trade swaps with financial intermediaries such as banks or 
other financial institutions. The financial intermediaries earn their profit from the basis 
point difference in the swaps they sell and buy. Financial institutions enter into offset-
ting swaps with companies and assuming that all parties honor their obligations, the 
financial institution is guaranteed to make a profit. (Hull 2012, 152) 
 
In real life the bought and sold swaps of a financial institution do not fully offset each 
other’s. Financial institutions perform so called market making. They are prepared to 
Euribor 6 month
5 %
Company BCompany A
4,70 %
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enter into swaps without having an offsetting swap with another party. Market makers 
quantify and hedge the risk these individual swaps are causing. They use for example 
forward rate agreements, bonds and interest rate futures to hedge these swaps. (Hull 
2012, 153) 
 
5.5.3 Cross currency swaps 
Cross currency swap is an agreement to exchange principal and interest payments in 
one currency for principal and interest payments in another. (Hull 2012, 165) Cross 
currency swaps can be used to change the transform borrowings in one currency into 
borrowings in another. (Hull 2012, 166) 
 
The principal amounts are exchanged between the parties at the start and end of the 
contract. The agreement requires the principal amount to be specified in both of the 
two currencies. The principal amounts are calculated using the foreign exchange rate at 
the swaps trade date. Therefore, the market value of the principal exchanges at the 
start of the contract should be roughly the same. At the time of the end principal ex-
change, the value of the principals can differ greatly as the FX rate has changed. (Hull 
2012, 166) 
 
5.6 Exchange-traded derivatives versus over the counter derivatives 
A major advantage of exchange traded futures and options compared to similar OTC 
contracts is that the derivatives exchange guarantees every derivative contract. This 
relieves the counterparties to a contract of the burden of assessing the creditworthiness 
of the other party. Like explained before, exchanges impose considerable margin re-
quirements on their members in order to protect themselves against the risk of de-
faults. Membership requirements are high and members’ positions are constantly 
monitored by the exchange. Exchanges also have to maintain large clearing funds to 
meet unforeseen market situations. (Pilbeam 2010, 324) 
 
International financial institutions have for years talked about the advantages and flexi-
bility of the OTC forward and options market. Since the demand and motives of cus-
tomers vary greatly, the exchange-traded derivative instruments are not always the best 
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answer to customer needs. To meet the customer demand, banks have created tailor 
made forwards and options. With these products banks are able to meet the customer’s 
size, price and expiration date needs better than with standardized derivatives. Over 
the counter derivatives do have some drawbacks that exchange traded derivatives lack. 
The lack of standardization of OTC contracts means that there is a limited secondary 
market for OTC contracts. Therefore, the liquidity in the exchange traded product is 
better. Each party to an OTC contract bears the risk of default on the part of their 
counterparty. Creditworthiness of contract counterparts is not a concern in exchanges. 
(Pilbeam 2010, 324) 
 
5.7 Effects of credit risk on OTC contracts 
Credit risk has traditionally been a big part of OTC markets. It is always possible that a 
party on the other side of an OTC contract defaults. (Hull 2012, 30) Regulators have 
for years demanded that financial institutions hold on to enough capital to reflect the 
credit risk they are exposed to (Hull 2012, 521) 
 
Calculating credit exposure of a bank is complicated. This is because, in case of a de-
fault, the claim rising from a derivative contract is more uncertain than in for example 
the case of a loan default. A bank with an outstanding derivative contract with a de-
faulting counterpart can find themselves in three different scenarios: 
- The derivative is always a liability to the bank 
- The derivative is always an asset to the bank 
- The derivative can become either an asset or liability to the bank 
(Hull 2012, 531-532) 
 
An example of the first scenario is a sold option position, example of the second sce-
nario is a bought option position and an example of the third scenario is a forward 
contract. (Hull 2012, 532) 
 
Derivatives contracts from the first scenario have no credit risk to the bank if the 
counterparty defaults. Derivatives in the second scenario always have credit risk and a 
loss is most likely to be experienced by the bank. Derivatives in the third scenario may 
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or may not have credit risk. This is determined by the value of the derivative at the 
time of the default. If the value is positive for the bank at the time of the default a loss 
is likely to occur. If the value is negative to the bank at the time of the default no loss is 
occurred. (Hull 2012, 532) 
 
As a safeguard to credit risk and defaults, the banks working in the over the counter 
market have started to adopt some of the procedures from the exchange traded deriva-
tives market. (Hull 2012, 30) 
 
5.7.1 Netting 
A confirmation is a legal documentation for an OTC derivative contract. The drafting 
of derivative confirmations is being facilitated by International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association ISDA. ISDA has grafted a number of ISDA Master Agreements that de-
fine the terms and clauses used in individual derivative confirmations. The definitions 
from the ISDA Master Agreement are agreed upon by counterparties and signed. The 
definitions from the signed ISDA Master Agreement cover all derivative contracts be-
tween the parties (Hull 2012, 155) 
 
One clause that has become a standard in ISDA Master Agreements is concerning net-
ting. The clause states that, if a company defaults on one derivative contract with their 
counterpart, it must default on all outstanding derivative contract with the same coun-
terpart. Using the netting clause can significantly reduce the credit risk of a financial 
institution. (Hull 2012, 534) 
 
Trade counterparty might have multiple outstanding derivative contracts that some 
have negative and some positive market value. The benefits of netting are that the 
market values of all outstanding derivatives are netted together and the net market val-
ue for the whole portfolio is the occurred loss. If only the derivatives with negative 
value would be defaulted, the losses would be higher as they are not being decreased 
by the positive values. (Hull 2012, 534) 
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5.7.2 Collateralization 
The use of collateral as protection from credit risk has been used in the OTC market 
for some time and is a similar process as posting margin in the futures market. Collat-
eral can be used when two parties enter into an OTC derivative contract. The parties 
agree to daily calculate the market value of the contract. The party to which the con-
tract value is decreasing is obligated to pay the value decrease to their counterparty. 
This daily payment is called variation margin. Variation margin payments are not set-
tlements on the derivative contract but a security deposit intended to ensure that future 
obligations rising from the derivative contract will be honored. The party collecting the 
collateral has to pay interest on the received amount. (Hull 2012, 31) 
 
There is usually a set threshold before collateral payments are required. Counterparties 
can agree to transfer collateral only when the value of the contract (or multiple con-
tracts) exceeds a threshold amount. When the threshold is exceeded, the party entitled 
to collect collateral sends their counterparty a collateral call. The collateral call amount 
is the difference between the threshold amount and the value of the contract. The 
threshold amount can be considered to be a line of credit the counterparties agree to 
grant each other. (Hull 2012, 536) 
 
In the event of a default of the party that has paid collateral, the collecting party, is en-
titled to seize the collateral. Using collateral does not eliminate credit risk completely. 
The collecting party is not fully protected from losses, as the collateral is only paid for 
the amount exceeding the threshold amount. This is the case even when the threshold 
amount is set to zero. Counterparties rarely decide to seize the paid collateral after the 
first failure to meet a collateral call. A failing counterparty can ignore collateral calls for 
some time before the collateral is seized. During this time the value of the derivative 
contract can move further in the collectors favor and the financial loss of the default 
rises. (Hull 2012, 536) 
 
5.7.3 Downgrade triggers 
One way to reduce credit risk is the using of so called downgrade triggers. Financial 
institutions can include clauses in derivative agreements that enable them to close out 
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their counterparts derivative contracts at market value if the counterpart’s credit rating 
falls below a certain level. (Hull 2012, 536) 
 
5.8 Credit derivatives 
Credit derivatives are contracts whose value depends on creditworthiness of one or 
more companies or countries. They allow companies to trade credit risk in much the 
same way as other derivatives are used to trade market risk. Before credit derivatives, 
market participants used to be in a position where they could do little once they had 
assumed credit risk expect wait and hope the source of the risk does not default. With 
credit derivatives, companies can hold the credit risk they want and seek protection 
against the risk they do not wish to be exposed to. So far banks have been the biggest 
buyers of credit protection and insurance companies have been the biggest sellers. 
(Hull 2012, 547) 
 
Traditionally banks have been in the business of originating loans and then bearing the 
credit risk that the borrower defaults. Banks are not keen on keeping these loans on 
their balance sheets. This is due to the fact that, after the capital required by the regula-
tors has been accounted for, the return earned on loans is smaller than returns on oth-
er assets. Therefore, banks have started creating asset backed securities of originated 
loans, in practice passing loans and their credit risk on to investors. Banks have also 
extensively used credit derivatives to shift credit risk in their loans to other parts of the 
financial world. Insurance companies have traditionally been the entities selling the 
credit risk protection to banks. Insurance companies have not been regulated as heavily 
as banks so they have been willing to bear credit risk in return for income. The end 
result was that the financial institution bearing the credit risk was not the entity that 
originally did the credit checks for the loan. The end result of this separation is ex-
plained in chapter 6. (Hull 2012, 548) 
 
5.8.1 Credit Default Swaps  
Credit derivatives are divided to single-name and multi-name instruments. Most popu-
lar single-name derivative is the credit default swap CDS. The payoff from the contract 
is tied to the creditworthiness of one company or country. There are two sides to a 
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CDS contract: the buyer and seller of protection. There is a payoff from the seller to 
the buyer of the protection if the specified company or country defaults on its’ issued 
bond obligations. (Hull 2012, 547) In return the seller of the CDS receives periodic 
payments from the buyer until the trade matures or the specified company or country, 
also called reference entity, defaults. (Hull 2012, 548) 
 
The default is called credit event. Credit event is described to be a failure to make a 
payment as it becomes due, a restructuring of existing debt or bankruptcy. (Hull 2012, 
549) If the reference entity defaults the seller of the CDS is obligated to buy bonds 
issued by the reference entity from the buyer of the protection at their face value. Typ-
ically the bonds don not change hands but the value of the bonds is exchanges as a 
cash settlement between the parties. (Hull 2012, 548-549) 
 
5.8.2 Collateralized debt obligations 
The most common multi-name credit derivative is called collateralized debt obligation 
CDO. When creating a CDO, a portfolio of debt instruments, like bonds, is chosen 
and a complex structure is created where the cash flows from the portfolio is divided 
to different categories for investors. (Hull 2012, 547) The mechanics of creating a 
CDO from mortgage loans is outlined in chapter 6.1 Securitization. 
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6 Systemic risk and dangers of  derivatives 
Derivatives are extremely flexible financial instruments. As mentioned earlier they can 
be used for hedging, speculating or arbitrage. The same flexibility that makes them 
suitable for multiple purposes can also cause problems. Occasionally traders with a risk 
mandate to hedge or use arbitrage end up opening speculative positions. Hence it is 
important for market participants to set up controls which ensure that derivatives con-
tracts are used for their intended purpose. It is also vital to set trading limits and ensure 
that these limits are enforced. (Hull 2012, 16) 
 
Derivatives can cause big problems, even when trading activities are performed accord-
ing to rules and risk is being monitored. Sometimes trading activities are more risky 
than the market participants understand. This was the situation leading to the credit 
crisis in 2007. Derivatives contracts linked with American mortgage loans that traders 
in the market entered into were much riskier than the financial institutions understood. 
The expectation on the market was that housing prices in the U.S. would keep rising or 
at worst level off. Many multi-name credit derivatives contracts were structured with 
increasing prices in mind. Hardly anyone on the market was prepared for the steep 
decline in housing prices. (Hull 2012, 16) 
 
6.1 Securitization 
Taking deposits from the public has traditionally been the key source of funding for 
banks. During the 1960s, banks in United States realized that they no longer could 
fund the increasing mortgage loan lending with incoming deposits. This realization led 
to the birth of mortgage backed security market (MBS). Portfolios of residential mort-
gage loans were created and interest and principal payments generated from these loan 
portfolios were packaged as securities. This act is called securitization. These securities 
were sold to investors and the revenue was used for funding new mortgage loans. The 
United States Government created the Government National Mortgage Association or 
GNMA. GNMA was tasked with guaranteeing the cash flows from qualifying mort-
gages and created the actual securities that were sold to investors. (Hull 2012, 180) 
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As a result, the banks that originated the mortgages no longer kept the mortgages on 
their balance sheet. Securitization allowed the banks to increase their lending faster 
than their deposits were growing. The government guarantee from GNMA protected   
investors against defaults of mortgage loan borrowers. As time passed, securitization 
was being applied to other asset classes such as credit card loans. As the market devel-
oped, investors no longer required guarantee from the government against defaults by 
borrowers. (Hull 2012, 180-181) 
 
The securitization arrangement can be explained by looking into how an asset backed 
security or ABS works. A portfolio of revenue generating assets such as mortgage 
loans is sold by the originating bank to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). (Hull 2012, 
181) A Special Purpose Vehicle is a special purpose legal entity that is set up for a spe-
cific limited purpose by a sponsoring company. In securitization the SPV is usually a 
trust that is separated from the sponsoring bank so that a bankruptcy of the bank has 
no effect on the SPV or vice versa. By setting up an SPV the bank can protect itself 
from losses incurred from the mortgage loans. (Pilbeam 2010, 416) 
 
The SPV allocates the bought assets to tranches (Hull 2012, 181). Tranches are related 
securities that are issued at the same time but have different risk and reward character-
istics (Pilbeam 2010, 505). These tranches can be divided to three levels based on their 
characteristics. The tranches are: senior tranche, mezzanine tranche and equity tranche. 
The senior tranche has the highest principal and is promised the lowest income. The 
equity tranche has the lowest principal and is promised the highest income. The mez-
zanine tranche is between them. The risk in equity tranche reflects the higher return. 
(Hull 2012, 181) 
 
The payout on the ABS follows a so called waterfall model. The income from the un-
derlying portfolio of loans is divided to principal and interest cash flows. Principal cash 
flows are allocated to the senior tranche until its principal has been repaid to investors. 
Then principal payments are allocated to the mezzanine tranche until its principal is 
repaid. Equity principal is repaid only when the mezzanine has been repaid. Same ap-
plies for the interest payments. The outstanding interest is first paid to senior tranche. 
Assuming that this can be paid, interest payments are then allocated to the mezzanine 
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tranche. Only when mezzanine tranche has been paid, will the equity tranche receive 
interest on its principal. The extent to which the tranches receive their principal back 
depends on the losses on the underlying assets. The difference in the riskiness off the 
tranche is reflected in its credit rating. Before the crisis, the senior tranche was typically 
rated as AAA, mezzanine tranche as BBB and the equity tranche was left unrated. 
(Hull 2012, 182) 
 
Credit rating is a way of describing the creditworthiness of a corporate bond. Credit 
ratings are provided by rating agencies such as Moodys, S&P and Fitch. A bond with 
the highest possible rating has virtually no change of defaulting. (Hull 2012, 521) 
 
Finding investors to buy the senior high rated tranches was usually not a problem as 
the tranches promised returns that exceeded the return of AAA-rated bonds. Equity 
tranches were usually bought back by the originator of the mortgage loans or sold to a 
hedge fund. Mezzanine tranches were a harder sell. Therefore, these mezzanine 
tranches were packaged with other mezzanine tranches to create Mezz ABS CDOs. 
The principal from these structures was then allocated to senior, mezzanine and equity 
tranches. The credit rating for the resulting tranches was such that the senior tranche 
has AAA rating although it was constructed of assets that originally had BBB rating. 
(Hull 2012, 183) 
 
6.2 The United States housing market 
The years between 2000 and 2005 was characterized in the U.S. by a great increase in 
so called subprime mortgage lending. Subprime mortgages are loans that are consid-
ered to be much riskier than normal loans. The relaxation of lending standards and the 
increase in subprime loans made house purchase possible for families that previously 
were considered ineligible to qualify for a mortgage. These individuals increased the 
demand for real estate and the housing prices rose. The situation of increased lending 
and higher house prices was attractive for mortgage lenders. Increased lending meant 
bigger profits. The hike in house prices also meant that the lending was covered by the 
underlying collateral (the house). If the borrower failed to pay the mortgage, the result-
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ing foreclosure would not lead to a loss as the house value exceeded the mortgage 
amount. (Hull 2012, 185) 
 
Mortgage lenders saw this as an opportunity to keep increasing their profits but the 
rising house prices presented a problem. First time house buyers were no longer able 
to afford to buy a house. In order to attract new house buyers, the mortgage lenders 
relaxed their lending standards. The amount of given loan as a percentage on the house 
value rose. Adjustable rate mortgages with a small teaser interest rate in the beginning 
followed by a significantly higher rate for the rest of the loan maturity was developed. 
People who could not normally afford to buy a house now had the opportunity to do 
so. (Hull 2012, 185) 
 
These subprime mortgages were securitized like explained previously. The resulting 
securities usually had no guarantees that interest or even principal would be paid. The 
act of securitization played a part in the way that mortgages were originated. The lend-
er had no incentive to consider the riskiness of the issued mortgage as they knew that it 
would be securitized and thus the risk would be for someone else to carry. The U.S. 
government also played a part in the problem via their actions that aimed in expanding 
home ownership. (Hull 2012, 186) 
 
A typical characteristic on U.S. mortgage loans is that the mortgages are nonrecourse. 
This means that in case of a default, the lender is allowed to take control of the house 
but other assets of the borrower are off limits to the lender. This basically means that 
the borrower can at any time force the lender to buy the house for the principal out-
standing on the mortgage loan. This characteristic encouraged speculative activity in 
the market and was a part cause of the house price bubble. (Hull 2012, 186) 
 
6.3 The bubble bursts 
No price bubbles can last forever. The house price bubble burst in early August 2007 
was one of the most catastrophic bubble bursts in history. In 2007 many mortgage 
holders realized they no longer could afford to pay their mortgage. One key reason was 
the teaser rates from the adjustable rate mortgages ended and the rates hiked.  Defaults 
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by borrowers led to foreclosures and the supply of houses on the market rose. This in 
turn led to decline in house prices. Some mortgage holders that had borrowed 100% or 
near 100% of the house cost ended up in a situation where the mortgage amount ex-
ceeded the value of their house and they in effect had negative equity. The lenders with 
negative equity could then exchange the house for the outstanding principal on the 
mortgage. The lender would then have to sell the house and push the prices even fur-
ther down. (Hull 2012, 187) 
 
As foreclosures increased, the losses incurred by mortgage loan originators also in-
creased. One could assume that a 35% reduction in house prices would lead to at max 
35% loss on the principal on the defaulting mortgages. This was unfortunately not the 
case. Many of the foreclosed houses were in poor condition and sold for a fraction of 
their value prior to the credit crisis. (Hull 2012, 187) 
 
Investors in asset backed securities that were formed of mortgage loans incurred major 
losses. Many of the ABS tranches were efficiently worthless by mid-2009. Financial 
institutions like UBS, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup had big positions in some of the 
now worthless tranches. This caused them huge losses. The losses forced some major 
restructuring of the financial giants and Lehman Brothers was even allowed to go 
bankrupt. (Hull 2012, 187) 
 
The losses that brought Lehman Brothers down were mainly due to its massive expo-
sure to subprime mortgages through its ABS holdings. The reason why Lehman had 
accumulated such a large exposure to subprime loans is not quite known. Either it had 
to hold the high risk ABS equity tranches because it could find a buyer for them or 
they held on to them willingly. Controllers in Lehman Brothers had warned the bank’s 
management of the risks inherent in their subprime exposure but management chose 
to ignore these warnings.  (Pilbeam 2010. 430-431) 
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers created great uncertainty in the financial market be-
cause it was a counterparty to tens of thousands of derivatives contracts around the 
globe. Hedge funds and financial institutions for whom Lehman acted as broker or 
prime finance provider found their accounts frozen and faced problems executing 
  
34 
trades. The Dow Jones index fell drastically, interbank interest rates rose significantly 
and there was a rush to withdraw funds from money markets around the world. 
(Pilbeam 2010. 430) 
 
The troubles experienced by the financial companies from the securities backed by 
residential mortgages led to severe credit crisis. The capital of banks had eroded by 
their losses. In 2008 the banks were increasingly risk averse and were reluctant to lend. 
Credit spreads, the excess of interest rate on a loan over risk free interest rate, had in-
creased significantly and even creditworthy individuals and corporations found bor-
rowing difficult. Spreads on the funding that banks offer each other’s also soared indi-
cating the reluctance to lend. (Hull 2012, 188) 
 
6.4 Credit crunch 
The sudden and very significant tightening of lending conditions which happened in-
dependently of official interest rates is called Credit Crunch. The market saw a signifi-
cant decrease in lending on the interbank market and between banks and their custom-
ers. Market participants increased their risk aversion and moved from risky high price 
assets like equities and corporate bonds to less risky government bonds. (Pilbeam 
2010, 427) 
 
As the financial world paralyzed, many banks found it near impossible to raise funds 
by issuing short term commercial papers, to borrow from other banks on the interbank 
markets or even to find buyers for some of their assets. The lack of liquidity in the 
market was increased by phenomenon called liquidity hoarding. Some financial institu-
tions chose to hoard whatever liquidity they had to make sure they could see them-
selves through the credit crisis. Central banks had to step in and buy much of the secu-
rities that financial institutions tried to sell. In this situation the central banks were in a 
way fulfilling their duty of being the lender of last resort. Central banks also increased 
the maturity of their lending and widened the range of assets they were prepared to 
accept as collateral for the provided liquidity. (Pilbeam 2010, 441) 
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One lesson learnt from the liquidity crisis was that prior to the crisis there had been 
too much focus on the capital adequacy of banks and not enough focus on liquidity 
issues. Once the crisis began, the disappearing liquidity of many financial instruments 
turned them practically untradeable. For example the secondary market for Collateral-
ized debt obligations practically dried up during the crunch. The lack of liquidity on the 
CDO marker made it impossible establish price for the existing CDOs that the banks 
had on their trading books. This created uncertainty over the viability and share prices 
of banks. Many financial institutions, dependent on the interbank market for their li-
quidity, struggled to finance their operations. Many financial institutions that had a 
healthy balance sheet and met capital adequacy regulations were unable to function due 
to lack of liquidity. (Pilbeam 2010, 452) 
 
Central banks also took action to lower short term interest rates. For example in the 
U.S. the Federal Reserve lowered their Federal Funds rate from 5.25 per cent in June 
2007 to a target rate of 0-0.25 per cent in December 2008. The interest rate cuts had 
three roles. They reduced the interest payments of heavily indebted consumers and 
companies. This had a major effect in helping consumers with floating rate mortgage 
loans to continue servicing their mortgage payments. The decrease in short-term rates 
helped increase profit margins of banks which are positively influenced by the spread 
between short-term and long-term rates of interest. Decreasing rates stimulated con-
sumer expenditure and economic activity. (Pilbeam 2010, 440) 
 
The traditional way for central banks to intervene in the markets is through open mar-
ket operations that influence short-term interest rates. These operations brought the 
short term rates to record low levels. During the crisis, central banks became increas-
ingly concerned by the relatively elevated levels of long-term interest rates. Therefore, 
central banks engaged in a new practice called quantitative easing. Central banks pur-
chased existing government and corporate backed bonds with the hope of raising their 
prices. The funds to purchase these securities were obtained by creating new money in 
central banks. The aim was to slow the speed of deflation that was occurring in the in 
the economy as a result of the crisis. Quantitative easing also pumped cash to banks in 
hope that it would encourage them to increase their lending to consumers and compa-
nies. (Pilbeam 2010, 442-443) 
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6.5 What went wrong? 
Multiple factors contributed to the crisis that started in 2007. The lending standards 
that mortgage originators used were too relaxed. Complex products were developed to 
enable mortgage originators to move credit risk to investors and make money while 
doing it. Rating agencies that were tasked with analyzing the riskiness of the ABS 
tranches were not used to rating such complex products. The products were new and 
there was little or no historical data to base analysis on. Their normal business of rating 
bonds did not prepare them enough for rating asset backed securities. The products 
that were sold to investors were complex and often investors and rating agencies were 
provided insufficient and inaccurate information about the quality of the underlying 
assets. Investors on these complex products were blinded in the bull market (boom) 
and thought they had come up with a money making machine. They chose to blindly 
trust rating agencies and failed to perform their own risk analysis on the products. The 
blinding factor was than ABS that were rated AAA produced significantly more return 
than bonds with the same low risk AAA rating. (Hull 2012, 188-189) 
 
Investors had the tendency to assume that an ABS tranche with a particular rating 
could be directly compared to a bond with the same rating. The rating agencies failed 
to take into account so called default correlation. Default correlation measures the ten-
dency of different borrowers to default on their loan at the same time. Default correla-
tion on mortgage loans is rather low during good times. If one borrower defaults it is 
often due to a reason that does not affect other borrowers. Individual defaults do not 
have negative effect on AAA rated tranches. During troubled times, like in 2007, the 
tendency for borrowers to default rises significantly and the reasons for the defaults are 
the same. As the default correlation increases also the losses on the asset backed secu-
rities rise. (Hull 2012, 188-189) 
 
One reason the rating agencies failed to rate asset backed securities lies in the pricing 
model used for credit derivatives. The pricing of asset backed securities was mostly 
based on David Li’s Gaussian copula pricing model which based the price of an ABS 
in the price of a related credit default swap. The pricing model worked by modeling 
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default correlations without using historical data but instead by using the prices of 
credit default swaps. The development of Li’s pricing model lead to rapid increase in 
the credit derivatives markets. The pricing model was created and used during a time 
of rapidly rising house prices. The rising prices led to very low default rates and also 
low correlation between defaults. When housing prices started falling and default cor-
relations started rising, then the ABS yields predicted by the pricing model were too 
low and CDS contracts seriously underpriced. Risk free AAA rated ABS tranches were 
in fact full of risk the pricing model could not foresee. (Pilbeam 2010, 435-436) 
 
A contributing factor to the size of the losses in the financial industry was the in-
creased use of leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to shareholder capital. The 
problem of increased leverage is that, although during good times it increases returns 
but it also increases risk and losses during periods of negative returns. (Pilbeam 2010, 
434) 
 
A major contributing factor to the crisis was the changes in the bank regulatory land-
scape in the late eighties and nineties. Banks around the world are regulated by the Ba-
sel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel accord of 1988 allowed banks to 
hold less capital for loans made for mortgages than for other consumer loans. Mort-
gage loans were considered to be relatively safe for banks. This increased the incentive 
for banks to increase their mortgage loan exposure. The Glass-Steagall act of 1993 had 
separated the United States banking system to two different sectors: The commercial 
banking sector and investment banking sector. The act was repealed in 1999 after 
heavy lobbying from the financial industry arguing that the separation was not needed 
and it hampered the competitiveness of the U.S. banking system. The repealing of the 
act allowed commercial banks to get involved in the issuance of CDOs, ABSs and in 
establishing special purpose vehicles. Some argue that the risk taking mentality of the 
investment banks started to permeate to the commercial banks. These regulatory 
changes played a major part in the severity of the crisis. (Pilbeam 2010, 431) 
 
One result of the credit crunch is the increased amount of legislation and regulation. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision working under The Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements creates global standards that are applied by bank supervisors in 
  
38 
countries around the world. Before the credit crisis, the Basel committee had released 
two sets of standards: Basel I and Basel II. These were mainly regulating the amount of 
capital banks are required to have in relation to their risk. (Hull 2012, 188-189)  
 
Although the new capital requirements for banks are out scoped in this thesis it is still 
good to understand the basics of the Basel accords. Under the Basel capital adequacy 
guidelines, bank capital is separated to two tiers. Tier 1 capital or core capital consists 
of stock equity, certain preferred stock, net reserves and minority interests in consoli-
dated subsidiaries. Tier 2 capital or supplementary capital consists of certain preferred 
stock, hybrid capital instruments, equity contract notes, loan-loss reserves, perpetual 
debt and subordinated debt. The riskiness of the capital is based on a five step credit 
risk weighting. The riskier the asset is, the more weight it gets when calculating risk 
adjusted capital amount. For example government treasury bills and cash contain no 
risk but loans to companies are considerably riskier. The amount of needed Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital is calculated from the risk adjusted capital amount and not from the real 
value of the assets in the capital. (Pilbeam 2010, 474) 
 
Too harsh capital requirements for banks could harm the economy during a recession. 
That is why some experts suggest a countercyclical capital regulation that would raise 
capital requirements during economic expansion to limit credit growth and in turn 
lower requirements during recession to encourage lending. (Pilbeam 2010, 478) 
 
Basel III was born of the credit crisis. The new regulation increases the amount and 
quality of capital requirements. It also requires financial institutions to meet standards 
on liquidity requirements. During the crisis banks found it difficult to find cheap short 
term funding so the new regulation tries to ensure that banks in the future don't see 
their short term funding drying up. On top of the Basel III regulation, local govern-
ments have created their own pieces of regulation. (Hull 2012, 188-189) 
 
6.6 Systemic risk 
Systemic risk is the risk that a default by one financial institution will cause a chain re-
action that leads to defaults by other institutions and dangers the stability of the whole 
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financial system. One major bank failing might cause other banks to struggle honoring 
their over the counter derivative contracts which in turn leads to more banks failing. 
During the financial crisis, global governments did not want to allow this to happen so 
instead of allowing large banks to fail, they bailed out many of the defaulting banks. 
The reason for this was that officials did not want the systemic risk to tumble the 
whole financial system. Financial authorities see that regulation must prevent this from 
happening again. (Hull 2012, 33) 
 
Regulators felt that credit default swaps were a source for systemic risk and danger to 
the financial markets. The danger with credit derivatives is that a default of one finan-
cial institution might lead to major losses for its credit default swap counterparts. The 
fear was fueled by the troubles of the insurance giant American International Group 
Inc. AIG. AIG was one of the biggest sellers of credit protection for the AAA rated 
tranches created from Mortgage loans. The sold credit protection proved to be ex-
tremely expensive for AIG, as mortgage loan holders defaulted, and it had to be bailed 
out by the U.S. Government. (Hull 2012, 550) 
 
Regardless of the bailouts, the credit default swap market survived the market turmoil 
of 2007 reasonably well. The market has come under increased regulatory pressure but 
the importance of credit default swaps will not likely decline. They are still an im-
portant way for companies to manage credit risk. (Hull 2012, 555) 
 
It is interesting to note that the term systemic risk has not yet been fully agreed upon 
by the financial world. Like the 2013 Nobel Prize winner Lars Peter Hansen (2013, 4) 
states, there are multiple notions for systemic risk. Some consider systemic risk to be a 
modern equivalent to a bank run where liquidity is escaping from banks. Others see it 
as a description of vulnerability of a financial network in which unwanted consequenc-
es of internal shock can spread and grow within the financial network. Maybe the most 
common version of systemic risk is the one where the insolvency of a major financial 
actor disrupts the financial network. In his opinion the term systemic risk is therefore:  
“a grab bag of scenarios that are supposed to rationalize intervention in financial 
markets. These interventions come under the heading of macroprudential poli-
cies." (Hansen 2013, 5) 
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As past recessions have been triggered by financial crisis, it comes as no surprise that 
there was legislative pressure for external monitoring, intervention and regulation of 
financial markets to reduce systemic risk. (Hansen 2013, 5) 
 
The losses on products created from residential mortgages should not be viewed as an 
indictment on the whole derivatives industry. The derivatives markets is a huge multi-
trillion dollar market that by most standards has been incredibly successful and has 
served the needs of its user well (Hull 2012, 779) 
 
To quote Alan Greenspan (2005) from the United States Federal Reserve: 
“The use of a growing array of derivatives and the related application of more-
sophisticated approaches to measuring and managing risk are key factors under-
pinning the greater resilience of our largest financial institutions” 
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7 Research methodology  
The research method chosen for this thesis is qualitative research. Qualitative research 
stresses the socially constructed nature of reality and seeks answers to questions that 
focus on how social experience is created and given meaning. Qualitative research is 
concerned on individual point of view and believes that it is possible to get close to 
individuals perspective through detailed interviewing and observation (Silverman 2005, 
10) 
 
7.1 Case study 
The principle of a case study is to study one case in great detail using whatever meth-
ods seen appropriate. While there might be variety of different research purposes and 
research questions, the general target is to develop as full an understanding of the case 
as possible. (Silverman 2005, 126) It is not enough just to describe the case but a study 
should produce explanations that are generalizable in some way. (Silverman 2005, 128)  
 
Methodology is a general approach to studying research topics. (Silverman 2005, 109) 
Available methods in quantitative research are: observation, textual analysis, interviews 
and transcripts. The choice between different methods reflects the chosen research 
strategy. (Silverman 2005, 111) Research strategy in this thesis is an instrumental case 
study. The aim of the case study is to provide insight to the phenomenon that is being 
researched by comparing it to established theory. The chosen research method for this 
thesis is the analysis of written documents, such as letters, articles, legal documenta-
tion, study papers and speeches.  
 
The research material for this thesis has been gathered from electronic sources. It is 
mostly taken from financial newspapers and statements given by financial industry 
leaders and financial regulators. Most interesting part of the research material is the 
letters sent between different regulators or between regulators and financial industry 
leaders. They give an interesting insight on how new regulation is born.  
 
  
42 
7.2 Reliability and validity  
A goal of research is to use measures and observations that are reliable and valid. Reli-
ability in qualitative research means that the observations made from the research ma-
terial are uniform, accurate, objective and consistent. Validity however, means that the 
research material itself makes sense, is meaningful and enables the researcher to draw 
conclusions from the sample to whole population. (Cresswell 2005, 162) 
 
The chosen source for the research material puts the validity of this thesis in doubt. A 
lot of the used material is taken from sources that are directly linked with financial in-
dustry. For example financial newspapers don’t have an incentive to disagree with the 
industry they depend on and quite naturally, the industry itself has no interest in ap-
plauding decisions made by regulators that will inherently increase their cost of doing 
business. The author of this thesis tried to avoid problems with validity by searching 
for multiple sources for each topic that was being researched. The aim of the author 
was to perform the research objectively with an outsider’s perspective. Sometimes that 
proved to be hard especially if the author had prior personal opinions on certain top-
ics. 
 
Reliability of the study has been ensured by working meticulously throughout the the-
sis process. The author has aimed to perform the study with as much care and atten-
tion to detail as possibly.  
  
43 
8 Regulation 
The over the counter derivatives market was at the center of the financial crisis and 
several causes of the crisis point to it. Increasingly complex and opaque derivatives 
products combined with the lack of transparency were contributing factors to the cri-
sis. It must also be noted that the public authorities failed to appreciate and address the 
risk building up in the financial market. Regulators failed to keep up with market inno-
vation but they also lacked the tools to monitor risk adequately. The explosion of out-
standing derivatives volumes outpaced the existing post-trading infrastructure. (Cœuré 
2013) 
 
Credit risk exposures related to bilaterally traded OTC derivatives helped to amplify 
the global financial crisis of 2008. Credit risk exposures were often left un-
collateralized. This lead to OTC derivatives users recording major losses as counterpar-
ty defaults became likely or realized. In addition third parties had little information 
about these bilateral credit exposures so they became hesitant to provide funding for 
institutions that may or may not face losses on their derivatives position. (Bank of In-
ternational Settlements 2013a) 
 
The Group of Twenty derivatives reforms program is a global effort to combat the 
dangers of derivatives. Local financial regulators have implemented and are in the pro-
cess of implementing market reforms aimed at reducing credit risk in the OTC deriva-
tives market. The key weapons in the regulators’ arsenal is a requirement for standard-
ized over the counter derivatives to be cleared through central counterparty clearing 
houses, requirements for collateral to be posted for current and potential future credit 
risk exposures, regardless of the trade being centrally cleared or not and requirements 
that financial institutions hold additional capital to offset their uncollateralized deriva-
tive exposures. (Bank of International Settlements 2013a) 
 
“While these reforms have clear benefits, they do entail costs. Requiring OTC 
derivatives users to hold more high-quality, low-yielding assets as collateral low-
ers their income. Similarly, holding more capital means switching from lower-
cost debt to higher-cost equity financing. Although these balance sheet changes 
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reduce risk to debt and equity investors, risk-adjusted returns may still fall. As a 
consequence, institutions may pass on higher costs to the broader economy in 
the form of increased prices.” (Bank of International Settlements 2013a) 
 
It is important to understand that the Group of Twenty reform program did not lead 
to international common financial derivatives standards. The members of the Group 
of Twenty have in varying speeds and degrees created their own legislation to reform 
the OTC market. (Valladares 2013, 1) 
 
8.1 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act or in short Dodd-
Frank aims to increase transparency and accountability in the derivatives market. This 
piece of United States legislature is tasked with protecting U.S. taxpayers against the 
need for future bailouts and buffers the financial system from unbearable risk taking. 
The American over the counter market will be regulated by the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
The content of the legislation is similar to the European legislation. (Senate Committee 
on Banking 2010) 
 
Dodd-Frank provides CFTC and SEC with authority to regulate the OTC derivatives 
market. The regulatory oversight hinders the possibilities for irresponsible practices 
and excessive risk taking. The legislation mandates central clearing and exchange trad-
ing for derivatives that can be cleared. It provides a role for both clearing houses and 
regulators to determine which derivatives products should be cleared. Products need to 
be approved by SEC and CFTC before a clearing house can clear them. The regulation 
puts safeguards in place for un-cleared derivatives by requiring margin payments for 
un-cleared trades to off-set the bigger risk they pose to the financial system. Margin 
payments on un-cleared trades encourage more trading to move to exchanges or clear-
ing houses. Market participants are required to provide their trade data to trade reposi-
tories to improve market transparency and provide regulators tools for monitoring and 
responding to increased risk. (Senate Committee on Banking 2010) 
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8.2 Agreement on new European rules to regulate Financial Derivatives 
(EMIR) 
The European Parliament and the Council reached an agreement in February 2012 on 
regulation to increase transparency, stability, and efficiency in derivatives markets. It 
was the needed step forward in establishing a safer regulatory framework for European 
financial markets. On July 2012, the regulation on over the counter derivatives, central 
clearing counterparties and trade repositories was adopted. The regulation entered into 
force on 16th of August 2012. This regulation enables the European Union to deliver 
the Group of Twenty commitments on OTC derivatives agreed in 2009. (European 
Commission 2012) 
 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation or EMIR guarantees that information on 
all European over the counter derivative contract will be reported to trade repositories 
and that the information is accessible to authorities. This information is intended to 
give policy makers and financial supervisors a clear overview of what is happening in 
the derivatives market. (European Commission 2012) 
 
The regulation mandates that all standard derivative contracts should be cleared 
through central counterparty clearing houses or CCPs. These CCPs are given strict 
organizational and business conduct requirements. Trades that are not cleared are to be 
susceptible to initial and variation margin payments. (European Commission 2012) 
 
8.2.1 Financial or non-financial counterparty 
A key concept in the EMIR regulation is the need to be able to regulate the use of de-
rivatives in a flexible way. Therefore, different level of regulation is needed for differ-
ent types of derivatives users. The Article 2 of regulation (EU) no 648/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories recognizes three different counterparty types: 
financial counterparty, non-financial counterparty below clearing threshold and non-
financial counterparty above clearing threshold.  
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8.3 Central counterparty clearing houses  
The Bank for International Settlements estimates that strict derivatives regulation can 
boost global economic output by 0.12% per year. Strict regulation also decreases the 
potential for financial crises. The Bank for International Settlements sees that regula-
tors and banks should aim to pass the largest possible amount of derivatives trades 
through central counterparty clearing houses. In their view the market of OTC deriva-
tives should be based around a modest number of central counterparty clearing houses. 
(Bloomberg 2013a) 
 
The reforms started by the Group of Twenty mandate that central counterparty clear-
ing houses must to be used for chosen OTC derivative contracts. Trades in the OTC 
market have traditionally been bilateral agreements between counterparties. Introduc-
ing a central counterparty clearing house to the market changes the situation. Trades 
are still negotiated between two counterparts but after the trade has been agreed on, 
both counterparts submit their trade details to a central counterparty clearing house in 
which they are members. The central counterparty clearing house approves the trades 
and becomes a counterpart for both original parties. Now both original parties have 
credit risk towards the clearing house but have no risk towards each other. Clearing 
houses are able to manage credit risk by requiring initial and variation margin from the 
original trade counterparties. Result is a reduction in credit risk not unlike with ex-
change traded derivatives (Hull 2012, 32) Central counterparty clearing houses increase 
overall market transparency by maintaining and distributing derivatives contract rec-
ords, including notional amounts and counterparty identities. (IMF 2010, 98) The use 
of central counterparty clearing house also reduces derivatives exposures by multilater-
ally netting them (IMF 2010, 97). 
 
One way for encouraging the use of clearing houses can be found from the Basel III 
accord for a global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. 
Basel III includes capital incentives for banks to utilize clearing houses for their over 
the counter derivatives. (Bank of International Settlements 2011, 8) This is done by 
raising the capital requirements needed for backing the credit exposure rising from un-
cleared over the counter derivatives. (Bank of International Settlements 2011, 2) 
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Clearing reduces the effect of a failure of a major market participant because the im-
pact is mitigated and absorbed by the default management protections of clearing 
houses. If a defaulting clearing member cannot honor its contracts, the losses will be 
mutualized for all members. In case of a default, the initial margin posted by the de-
faulting clearing member is used to honor its outstanding contracts. If the amount of 
initial margin is insufficient, the clearing house seizes the funds the defaulting member 
has deposited in the guarantee fund of the clearing house. If the deposit from the de-
faulting member is not enough then the central counterparty clearing house retrieves 
funds from the whole guarantee fund including contributions of other clearing mem-
bers. (IMF 2010, 97) 
 
A major indicator of the safety central counterparty clearing houses bring can be found 
from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008. All Lehman Brothers’ interest rate 
swap positions that were cleared in LCH.Clearnet SwapClear settled without difficul-
ties in a few days following the bankruptcy. All other clearing members were paid what 
they were owed without using Lehman’s entire initial margin and without having to 
resort to the guarantee fund. (IMF 2010, 99) 
 
Even though the regulation is pushing trades to central counterparty clearing houses, 
there is still a need for non-cleared OTC derivatives. Non-cleared derivatives have a 
vital role in risk management which cannot always be replicated with clearable instru-
ments. If derivatives users are forced to abandon non-cleared derivatives and replace 
them with unsuitable or imperfect hedges using only clearable instrument, they might 
face unwanted basis risk (the risk of the derivatives instrument not protecting from the 
desired financial risk). (ISDA 2013b, 5) 
 
8.3.1 OTC clearing today 
The use of central counterparty clearing houses is commonplace globally although 
clearing regulation in all jurisdictions has not yet entered into force. The financial in-
dustry saw the value of using central counterparty clearing houses for standardized 
derivatives even before the credit crisis. (ISDA 2013b, 7) 
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Table 1 shows how the amount of cleared interest rate derivatives has dramatically in-
creased in size between 2007 and 2012. At the summer of 2012, 54.2% of the notional 
outstanding of interest rate swaps were cleared. This is a big increase compared to the 
21.3% just four and a half years earlier. During this time derivative users and central 
counterparty clearing houses have also reduced the total amount of notional outstand-
ing trough portfolio compression. As a result there is less total outstanding derivative 
notional out of which a bigger percentage has been cleared (ISDA 2013b, 7) 
 
Table 1. Cleared OTC interest rate swaps 
  Dec. 07 Dec. 08 Dec.  09 Dec. 10 Dec. 11 June 12 
OTC Interest Rate 
Swaps outstanding - 
USD trillion 255,2 265,3 241,6 240,1 262,3 246 
Cleared % 21,30 % 28,60 % 44,60 % 51,80 % 53,50 % 54,20 % 
(ISDA 2013b, 7) 
  
Large central counterparty clearing houses like LCH.Clearnet SwapClear have reported 
significant increase in the amount of cleared notional. On 28.3.2014 their position of 
cleared interest rates swaps had a notional outstanding of 233 trillion USD. This is al-
most the size of the global notional outstanding of cleared and non-cleared trades in 
mid-2012. 
 
8.3.2 Clearing obligation in Europe 
According to the regulation (eu) no 648/2012 of the European parliament and of the 
Council, all OTC trades suitable for central counterparty clearing must be cleared by 
the end of 2012. The regulation honors EUs commitment to the Group of Twenty 
about enforcing a clearing obligation in Europe.  
 
The European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) is responsible for preparing 
technical standards for European central counterparty clearing. ESMA is tasked with 
specifying the class of OTC derivatives that will be subject to clearing obligation and 
the date when the clearing obligation takes effect. The process of creating these tech-
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nical standards will begin when a central counterparty clearing house is authorized un-
der EMIR. ESMA has six months to prepare the standards following the authorization 
of a clearing house. (ESMA 2013c, 6).   
 
Harry Harrison from Barclays Plc hopes that ESMA would follow USA’s example 
when preparing the technical standards by phasing the start of the clearing obligation. 
"Staggered implementation of this was key to the success of the roll-out in the US – 
and Europe has to follow that pattern”.  In the U.S. even with very clear phasing of 
different user segments there was still a rush before every phase to onboard in to clear-
ing houses. Harrison says that it might help the implementation if ESMA had the pow-
er to give an industry or individual company extra time to comply with the clearing 
obligation. (ISDA 2014h) 
 
The first central counterparty clearing house to receive authorization under EMIR is 
Nasdaq OMX. OMX received authorization on 18.3.2014. (NASDAQ OMX 2014) 
This means that ESMA has until 18.9.2014 to provide standards for clearing. The 
clearing obligation might be in force earliest 18.12.2014 meaning that all following 
OTC trades that are technically possible to clear must be centrally cleared. The first 
clearing obligation will be limited to all or some of the OTC derivatives included in the 
Nasdaq OMX authorization. Products included in the authorization are:  
- Interest rate swaps in DKK, EUR, NOK and SEK. 
- Overnight Indexed Swaps in EUR and SEK 
- Rate Agreements in DKK, EUR, NOK and SEK 
In the beginning non-financial counterparts under clearing threshold are excluded from 
the clearing obligation as long as the trades are done for hedging purposes. The clear-
ing threshold is so high that it is possible to say that all non-bank corporations are able 
to trade without clearing in the immediate future. (Nordea Markets 2014b) 
 
The authorization of Nasdaq OMX as a central counterparty clearing house under 
EMIR has caused commotion in the derivatives market. It has led to a situation where 
European derivatives users are uncertain how to risk-manage and price EUR denomi-
nated interest rate derivatives. The reason can be found from a widely misunderstood 
frontloading requirement under EMIR. The frontloading requirement mandates de-
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rivatives users to backload certain derivative trades to a central counterparty clearing 
house, specifically those transactions traded between the time when ESMA is told a 
central counterparty clearing house has been authorized to clear a class of derivatives 
and the start of the actual clearing obligation. This causes problems because before 
ESMA is ready with the standards it is uncertain for the market which trades will be 
captured by the frontloading requirement and at which point in time. (ISDA 2014b) 
 
As mentioned before, ESMA has six months to prepare standards for clearing after 
they are notified of authorization of a clearing house. These standards will outline 
which products are mandatory for clearing. After ESMA has prepared the standards, 
the European Commission has three months to endorse the standards before they are 
passed to the European Parliament and Council of the European Union which have up 
to two months to accept them (or six months if the council has modified the rules). 
After approval the clearing rules are published in an official journal and come into 
force 20 days later. (ISDA 2014b) 
 
Euro interest rate swaps is the largest class of derivatives in Europe. As Nasdaq OMX 
received authorization to clear them, it means that any EUR denominated interest rate 
swap transacted in Europe after 18 March 2014 may need to be frontloaded to a CCP 
at some unknown time in the future. This uncertainty creates problems for derivatives 
users. It is not known how individual trades from now on should be treated. Are they 
cleared, non-cleared or a mixture of both? This is important because cleared and non-
cleared trades are subject to different funding and capital requirements. (ISDA 2014b)  
With trades currently being priced as a bilateral OTC contract, derivatives users can 
only wonder how that price will change when and if ESMA deems a particular product 
clearable in future (The Trade 2014b). It is nearly certain that the clearing mandate will 
apply for EUR interest rate swaps but it is not known when. (ISDA 2014b) 
 
Financial markets had hoped that the European regulators would have provided more 
information on the frontloading before authorizing a central counterparty clearing 
house. Without guidance derivatives users have no way of knowing whether any single 
transaction will ultimately be subject to frontloading or not. The authorization of 
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Nasdaq OMX came as a shock as the markets was hoping for ESMA to provide guid-
ance first. (ISDA 2014b) 
 
ISDA and another financial industry association FIA Europe have asked ESMA to 
work with the European Commission and Parliament to resolve the issues over front-
loading as soon as possible. In a letter from 20 March 2014 they say: 
“Affected OTC derivatives contracts cannot be accurately priced once frontload-
ing is triggered – this in turn reduces market certainty and potentially discourages 
market participants, including end-users, from comprehensively managing their 
risk exposures. Swift action is essential to ensure that Europe’s capital markets 
can continue to serve its end-users and the real economy” (ISDA 2014c) 
 
Chief Executive Officer Simon Puleston Jones of FIA Europe said that ESMA under-
stands why frontloading is problematic to derivatives users, but the issue is now down 
to politics. “Politicians who agreed on frontloading are now being asked to change 
their minds.” (The Trade 2014b) 
 
The concerns ISDA and FIA have raised will not have an effect on the already passed 
regulation. They hope that ESMA takes them into account when preparing the tech-
nical standards for clearing. This is a politically difficult situation as agreeing to the in-
dustry’s point of view could indicate that the European authorities acknowledge that 
the regulation might have gone further than needed. Politicians might have hard time 
doing this. As Simon Puleston Jones says “But they will be wary about doing it because 
it could set a precedent – agreeing to regulation, only to find years or months later that 
it is changed” .(The Trade 2014b) 
 
End users of derivatives do not see the obligation to use central counterparty clearing 
houses as a significant tool to reduce systemic risk. International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association conducted a survey early 2014 asking buy side derivatives users about 
their opinion of the effectiveness of the derivatives reform. In general end users feel 
that the derivatives market is on a sounder footing than before the crisis. About 60% 
of the survey responders felt that the market is safer now. The reason for the increased 
safety is unfortunately not due to regulation of derivatives but the actions taken by the 
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Basel committee on bank capital rules and stricter credit policies. Only 7.1% of re-
spondents said that the requirement to centrally clear OTC derivatives is a very im-
portant tool in decreasing systemic risk. In comparison 18.75% said that it is not im-
portant at all. (Risk.net 2014f) 
 
The chairman of International Swaps and Derivatives Association Stephen O’Connor 
finds it interesting that end users do not see the value of clearing as it inherently reduc-
es systemic risk. Eric Litvack from International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
and Societe General believes that buy side companies are willing to see benefits only in 
the bank regulatory reform and not in the derivatives reform because the derivatives 
reform hits them directly. Companies are in favor of moving OTC trades to central 
counterparty clearing houses and getting the benefits of reduced counterparty credit 
risk and reduced balance-sheet exposure. But companies are not willing to share in the 
financial responsibility if a central counterparty clearing house goes down. Financial 
risk does not go away with clearing since there is always risk in the derivatives market. 
Clearing houses just mitigate and centralize this risk. (Risk.net 2014e) 
 
Non-financial counterparties under the clearing threshold are not affected by the clear-
ing mandate. But the clearing mandate will have a major impact on for example asset 
managers who up until now have not been mandated to clear their over the counter 
trades. These companies will gain benefits of reduced counterparty credit risk through 
clearing. But unfortunately they will in some cases gain new exposures caused by the 
daily variation margins payments to central counterparty clearing houses. The need to 
always have cash to meet variation margin payments can be problematic. Asset manag-
ers need to use more repurchasing agreements to handle their variation margin re-
quirements. Asset managers usually use same counterparts in their OTC and repur-
chasing agreements. So in the case of some asset managers, clearing effectively just 
shifts counterparty risk form OTC trades to the repurchasing agreements. (Risk.net 
2014f) 
 
Although central counterparty clearing houses are designed to mitigate systemic risk, 
they might actually be a major source of risk. A systemic risk survey published by De-
pository Trust and Clearing Corporation DTCC in March 2014 shows a growing num-
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ber of financial industry participants worried about risk in central counterparty clearing 
houses. As a result of increasing regulation, clearing houses will house more and more 
risk. The survey found 18% of respondents, up from 8% in 2013, fearing central coun-
terparty clearing houses could become single points of failure in the market during a 
financial crisis. (The Trade 2014c) 
 
It is also worth noting that although clearing will become mandatory for certain com-
panies; this does not mean that it will be free. For example SwapClear operated by 
LchClearnet can charge up to GBP 2.250.000 a year from its clearing members. Other 
central counterparty clearing houses have similar clearing fees in place. (LchClearnet 
2014)  
 
 
8.4 Trade repositories  
One of the root causes for the financial crisis was the lack of transparency in the over 
the counter derivatives market. There are two dimensions to the lack of transparency: 
lack of information due to the missing reporting requirements to financial authorities 
and data fragmentation. These resulted in difficulties for authorities to get a full picture 
of the derivatives market before and during the financial crisis. (Cœuré 2013) 
 
In practice comprehensive derivative market information was either totally unavailable 
or incomplete. Even if trade data was available for regulators, it could not be compared 
across jurisdictions due to different accounting assumptions and valuations. Also, fi-
nancial innovation that was intended to limit risk, especially securitization and hedging 
through derivatives, increased the complexity of the financial market and made it diffi-
cult to monitor. (Cœuré 2013) 
 
Unlike stock exchanges that were tightly regulated and obliged to disclose information 
on prices and orders to regulators, over the counter derivatives markets had no such 
obligation. At the peak of the credit crisis, neither market participants nor authorities 
were able to monitor the market for credit default swaps. Therefore, it was impossible 
to evaluate counterparty credit risk correctly. This made it impossible to use credit de-
rivatives that are designed for credits risk mitigation for their original purpose. Since 
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the crisis, global authorities have implemented regulation ensuring that counterparties 
report derivatives trades to trade repositories. (Cœuré 2013) 
 
The main objective of reporting to trade repositories, as set by the Group of Twenty, is 
to improve transparency in the derivatives market. By increasing transparency, authori-
ties can address concentrations of risk and better protect the market against market 
abuse. Mandatory reporting is also useful in promoting focus on operational and coun-
terparty risk management. A prerequisite for effective reporting is that market partici-
pants use automated and centralized post-trade processes. These benefits have a clear 
effect on the whole financial system. The Group of Twenty has left the implementa-
tion of trade reporting to local jurisdictions. (Financial Stability Board 2013, 15)  
 
According to the regulation (eu) no 648/2012 of the European parliament and of the 
council, counterparties and CCPs that enter into, modify, or terminate a over the coun-
ter or exchange traded derivative contract must ensure that the details of that contract 
are reported to a trade repository. European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
was tasked with the practical work to design market practices that improve transparen-
cy in the derivatives market, protect against market abuse and mitigate systemic risk. 
(European Securities and Markets Authority ESMA 2013a, 55) 
 
EMIR mandates that a set of trade information needs to be reported to a trade reposi-
tory by both counterparties to a trade. These include counterparties to the contract, 
beneficiary of the rights and obligations rising from it, main details of the contract in-
cluding the type, underlying, maturity, notional value, price and settlement date. (Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority ESMA 2013a, 56) 
 
Reporting of OTC and exchange traded derivatives to a trade repository became man-
datory on 12.2.2014. The implementation of trade reporting did not go totally accord-
ing to plan. Following chapters outline problems caused by missing legal entity identifi-
ers, lack of common reference numbers and lack of global cooperation between finan-
cial authorities. 
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8.4.1 Legal Entity Identifier or LEI 
During the years before the financial crisis, many attempts have been made to establish 
a common global legal entity identifier for the financial industry. Up until recently the 
industry has failed to overcome the inherent difficulties in setting up such a global sys-
tem. (London Stock Exchange 2013, 5) Before the crisis there was no commonly ac-
cepted, accurate and comprehensive system for the identification of parties to financial 
transactions (London Stock Exchange 2013, 4).  
 
The onset of the financial crisis exposed fundamental problems in the way financial 
transactions are made. The crisis showed that major improvements to the world’s fi-
nancial data systems were needed. These improvements should make it easier to settle 
fundamental questions of ownership and debt liability. One key part of these im-
provements was to initiate the process of creating a common legal entity identifier or 
LEI. In essence, the LEI initiative is designed to create a global reference data system 
that identifies every legal entity in any jurisdiction that is part of a financial transaction. 
(London Stock Exchange, 5) Trade repositories require that the transactions reported 
to them use LEI as the method of identification for the parties in all transactions 
(DTCC, 5).   
 
Only a small number of European derivatives users have so far applied to receive a 
legal identity identifier. This is disappointing as obtaining a LEI code is a prerequisite 
for being able to trade derivatives after February 2014. (ISDA 2014a) The Federation 
of Finnish Financial services estimates that more than 10,000 Finnish entities would 
need a legal entity identifier but before the February 2014 deadline, only 1166 compa-
nies had obtained one. (Risk.net 2014a) In total around 240000 LEIs have been applied 
for but estimates suggest that over a million identifiers are needed in order to identify 
all derivatives users. (International Financing Review 2014a) 
 
8.4.2 Unique Trade Identifier or UTI 
To be compliant with European trade reporting regulation, parties of a trade must use 
a common trade identifier when reporting trades to a trade repository. (ISDA 2013a, 4) 
Unique Trade Identifier or UTI is the method the financial industry has chosen to use 
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as a common way to identify derivatives transactions. Using a common reference not 
only enables regulatory compliance but it also provides a common way to identify 
transactions, promotes efficiency and facilitates global aggregation and reconciliation of 
trade repository data. (ISDA 2013a, 5-6) 
 
European Securities and Markets Authority did not provide much guidance in how the 
common trade identifier should be formulated. Both the buy side companies and 
banks are blaming each other for not being clear on how they will handle the genera-
tion of the trade identifier going forward. (Risk.net 2014b). International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association has prepared standard documentation that the financial indus-
try agrees to follow for the generation of the Unique Trade Identifier. (ISDA 2013a, 4) 
These standards were not published until September 4th 2013. The standards assign 
responsibility for creating the UTI to different trade counterparts across a range of 
situations. (Risk.net 2014c) 
 
The rules are complex and there have been problems in communicating new unique 
trade identifiers between banks and their counterparts. Due to the tight time con-
straints it is no wonder that financial institutions and corporations have not had the 
time to prepare their IT systems and communicate their UTI processes to customers 
before February 2014. (Risk.net 2014c) 
 
8.4.3 Trade reporting in reality 
Under EMIR the obligation to report trades to trade repositories covers all OTC and 
exchange traded derivative contracts. All underlying asset classes are in scope including 
interest rate, FX, commodity, credit and equity derivatives. The reporting obligation 
started on 12.2.2014. Meaning that, all contracts entered into on or after reporting start 
date 12.2.2014 have to be reported to a repository by the end of next business day. 
Financial Institutions like Nordea Bank Finland offer their customers a service where 
the bank reports new and historical derivative contracts to a trade repository. This 
means that the customer does not need to be actively involved in the reporting pro-
cess. (Nordea Markets a. 4) It is still important to remember that if a company chooses 
to let their bank counterparts handle trade reporting, they still need to verify the re-
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ported data is correct (ISDA 2014a). Banks do not assume liability for incorrectly re-
ported trades; neither does the standard reporting delegation agreement from ISDA 
(Risk.net 2014c) 
 
In order for the reporting to be accurate, there are some actions all entities, even small 
companies, entering into derivative contracts need to take. Entities are mandated to 
acquire a LEI code for their company and inform it to their trading counterparts. Enti-
ties need to verify that the classification of their company as financial counterparty, 
non-financial counterparty below clearing threshold and non-financial counterparty 
above clearing threshold has been correctly done by their trading counterparts.  Non-
Financial counterparts must also inform their counterparts if the contracts they are 
entering into are done due to speculative reasons. It is every entity’s responsibility to 
provide this data to their trading counterparts or else they will not be in compliance 
with EMIR regulation. (Nordea Markets a. 5) 
 
8.4.4 Illusion of clarity 
An editorial in Bloomberg news highlights a problem in regulatory trade reporting. It 
raises a concern that across the globe in 11 different jurisdictions 22 different trade 
repositories collect derivative trade data, each with their own reporting requirements 
formats and legal mandates. The regulators in charge of overseeing the financial system 
have much more data than they had before the financial crisis but they are not capable 
of using said data. The noble idea of the Group of Twenty to concentrate derivatives 
data has been undone by local regulators not working together. Financial Stability 
Board mandated by the Group of Twenty is studying possibilities to aggregate trade 
data across repositories in different jurisdictions. This would require that regulators 
around the world coordinate their work, harmonize reporting rules and gather trade 
date in compatible formats. (Bloomberg 2014a) 
 
Robert Pickel the chief executive officer of the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association ISDA shares the concerns of the editorial staff of Bloomberg. He feels the 
sheer volume and inconsistency of trade data collected by trade repositories is a major 
problem that will only get worse as more and more trade reporting mandates come 
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online. He feels that the work the Financial Stability Board has started in order to har-
monize reporting data will eventually enable regulators to obtain a clear view of the 
market and help them spot the buildup of systemic risk. The fact is that at the moment 
regulators do not have a clear picture of the market and the situation will remain the 
same until a new and viable reporting mechanism is in place. As a spokesperson for the 
financial industry Pickel blames the regulators by saying “Given the time, expense and 
resource that everyone – dealers, end-users and infrastructure providers – have put 
into meeting the mandates, it is disappointing a global framework for consistent data 
reporting wasn’t put in place by regulators from the start.” (ISDA 2014a) Pickel’s opin-
ion is in line with an earlier statement from the International Monetary Fund: “Ideally, 
there should be a single trade repository for each product type that collects and shares 
information in ways that are useful to the relevant authorities.” (IMF 2010, 99) 
 
The problems with the reported data have not gone unnoticed by the authorities. 
Trade reporting has been mandatory in the USA since spring 2013. In a recent speech 
Mark Wetjen, the chairman of The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
said that the data provided to them has not been clean enough for them to make sense 
of it as quickly and easily as they want to. Scott O’Malia, a commissioner in The Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission, voiced the same concerns already in March 
2013, saying the data was not giving the regulators a full picture of the swaps market. 
The data was not sufficient to help regulators detect the kind of losses that occurred 
during the financial crisis. O’Malia pushes the responsibility to the regulators saying 
“The commission needs to be precise about what it wants from the market.” In order 
to remedy the situation, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has approached 
existing trade repositories asking their opinions about how to report trades.  (Bloom-
berg 2014b) 
 
8.4.5 Criticism over the reporting mandate implementation in Europe 
European derivatives users have had hard time adjusting to the new reporting rules. 
The scope of the reporting mandate is vast, capturing all asset classes at once without 
any phasing in. Including OTC and exchange traded derivatives at the same time adds 
to the confusion. ESMA only officially confirmed that exchange traded derivatives 
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need to be reported in September 2013. This left derivatives users with only a little 
time to prepare before the reporting mandate came in to force in February 2014. (IS-
DA 2014a) 
 
The regulators failed to properly instruct market participants on how to report data 
subject to privacy laws. It was unclear how to report non-cleared trades that are subse-
quently cleared. It was not known if a trade notional amount needs to be re-reported as 
it changes overtime. There was a lack of guidance how to report complex or bespoke 
trades where each market participant could in theory use different trade capture mod-
els. (ISDA 2014a) 
 
Even though trade reporting became mandatory in the European Union on 12.2.2014, 
some companies have been very late in their actions to comply with the regulation. 
Companies like MarkitServ which provide, regulatory reporting services to buy-side 
companies have informed that companies were still approaching them for reporting 
services after the reporting mandate came to effect in mid-February 2014. They feel 
that there has been a signal from regulators that there will be some leniency for com-
panies that are showing best efforts to comply with the reporting mandate even if they 
are unable to comply. (The Trade 2014a) 
 
Even companies that are compliant in theory have faced technical reporting problems. 
Some market participants have not been able to report their trades due to backlogs in 
trade repositories during onboarding. The problems ranged from not being able to 
submit data to repositories to not being able to access already reported trade data. (The 
Trade 2014a) 
 
One of the trade repositories that struggled with technical problems was the Deposito-
ry Trust & Clearing Corporation DTCC. Their chief executive Sandy Broderic partially 
puts the blame on the way the European regulation was implemented. It required both 
exchange traded and over the counter derivatives to be reported by each party to a 
trade. It also called for reporting to start on the same date for all instruments and all 
market participants. In other jurisdictions, for example in USA, reporting requirements 
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have been phased in over time which helped to spread the initial workload. (Risk.net 
2014d) 
 
Verena Ross, Executive Director from The European Securities and Market Authority 
ESMA asked in an August 2013 letter to the European Commission to postpone the 
reporting requirement of exchange trade derivatives by one year until end of January 
2015. She stated that the technical standards on reporting to trade repositories did not 
adequately distinguish between OTC and exchange traded derivatives.  The one year 
postponement would have allowed ESMA to provide further guidance and given the 
market participants more time to prepare for reporting. Her fear was that reporting 
exchange traded derivatives already from 2014 would prove inconsistent and would 
not serve the purposes of the regulation. (ESMA 2013b) The European Commission 
did not agree to ESMA’s request. Patrick Pearson, head of financial markets unit in 
European Commission stated “The decision has been taken that the deferral ESMA 
suggested will not take place. ESMA is now engaged – and, I think, working – on a set 
of clarifications for the industry, through FAQs, to ensure the guidelines and guidance 
is out there as soon as possible for industry to start working on its systems” (Risk.net 
2013) ESMA did provide further clarification in FAQ documents. The last one being 
released only six hours before the reporting mandate entered into force in February 
2014. (Risk.net 2014g) 
 
A major problem for trade reporting in Europe is that there are different definitions 
for derivatives in different European Union member states. On 14.2.2014, ESMA 
wrote a letter to Michel Barnier, commissioner for internal markets and services at the 
European Commission, asking for clarity on the definition of derivatives within the 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation. In the letter, ESMA states there is no sin-
gle, commonly adopted definition of a derivative in the European Union because the 
scope of financial instruments under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
MiFID was subject to interpretation in member states. This is especially true for FX 
forwards and physically settled commodity forwards. There are big differences in what 
is considered to be a FX spot and what an FX forward within the European Union. 
ESMA asks the European Commission to provide clarification urgently in order to 
ensure a consistent application of EMIR regulation. Until the European Commission 
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provides clarification, ESMA states it understands if national authorities will not im-
plement the relevant provisions of EMIR for contracts that are not clearly identified as 
derivatives across the Union. (European Securities and Markets Authority ESMA 
2014) 
 
The first few weeks of European trade reporting have already indicated that the report-
ing implementation did not go according to plan. Both Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation DTCC and Unavista, a trade repository run by the London Stock Ex-
change, report that approximately half of the trades reported to them cannot be 
matched. The situation with OTC trades is marginally better than with exchange traded 
derivatives. The reasons for the poor matching records can be found from the trade 
data provided to the depositories. The counterparties to a trade are not always report-
ing trades to repositories in the same way. There are approximately 80 data fields that 
must be reported so it is no wonder that breaks in the reporting are frequent. More 
problematic is that some companies have started reporting without a LEI or UTI 
which makes it impossible to find their counterpart to the reported transaction. This 
leads the repository to consider two sides of the same transaction to be two totally un-
related unreconciled transactions. (Risk.net 2014g) 
 
If trade counterparts are unable to provide key matching fields like UTI and LEI, then 
trade matching is not possible. Unavista believes that it will take months before the 
reporting process runs smoothly. As all asset classes and users were mandated to start 
reporting on the same date, it will take months for the regulation and technical stand-
ards to evolve and standardize. (Risk.net 2014) Lee Betsill from CME Clearing Europe 
feels that the European reporting mandate was rushed into place and the inclusion of 
exchange traded derivatives now seems like a mistake. (International Financing Review 
2014a) 
 
The European Securities and Markets Authority has a different view on the success of 
the implementation. Olga Petrenko, market integrity officer with ESMA said that prob-
lems in reporting were expected and stressed the large amount of work required by the 
industry. She spoke in International Swaps and Derivatives association’s annual general 
meeting in Munich. "Given the short time frame, reporting was done pretty well. In the 
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last 17 months we've managed to come up with implementing measures and the indus-
try was able to digest those requirements, to accommodate the systems and stand ready 
to submit the reports”. She continued saying that the regulators had no expectations 
that the reporting would run smoothly from day one. In regulator’s view point the im-
plementation was satisfactory. In ESMA’s opinion problems and are challenges a natu-
ral part of the switch to Europe's new reporting rules. (Risk.net 2014i) 
 
A survey conducted by International Swaps and Derivatives Association shows that 
end users of derivatives fail to find benefits from mandatory trade reporting. More 
than 55% percentages of them find the trade reporting requirement to be unimportant 
or only marginally important in improving market stability. A big part on end user 
opinion could be found from the near catastrophic launch of trade reporting in Europe 
(Risk.net 2014f) 
 
8.5 Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives 
The Group of Twenty agreed in 2011 to add margin requirements for non-centrally 
cleared derivatives to their derivatives market reform program. They asked the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions to develop consistent global standards for margin requirements. They 
released two consultative papers in July 2012 and February 2013. They invited market 
participants to comment on the working papers. After the comment rounds and a 
quantitative impact study they released the final regulatory framework in September 
2013. (Bank of International Settlements 2013c, 1) 
 
The introduction of margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives has two 
major benefits: Reduction of systemic risk and promotion of central clearing. (Bank of 
International Settlements 2013c, 2) 
 
Only standardized over the counter derivatives are suited for central clearing. A major 
part of existing derivatives are not standardized and cannot therefore be cleared. Inter-
national Monetary Fund estimated in 2010 (IMF 2010, 101) that one quarter of interest 
rate swaps, one third of credit default swaps and two thirds of other over the counter 
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derivatives are not sufficiently standardized and liquid enough to be centrally cleared. 
These non-standardized non-cleared trades totaling hundreds of trillions of dollars in 
notional amounts pose major systemic contagion and spillover risk. Imposing margin 
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives is expected to reduce systemic risk 
by making sure that collateral is available to offset possible losses caused by a default 
of a counterparty. Margin requirements are also seen to have macro prudential benefits 
by limiting the increase of uncollateralized exposures in the financial system (Bank of 
International Settlements 2013c, 2) 
 
Following the decisions made by the Group of Twenty, central clearing will be manda-
tory for most standardized derivatives. The use of a central counterparty clearing house 
increases the cost of entering into standardized derivatives contracts. The costs are 
incurred from the margin that has to be paid to the clearing house. Imposing a similar 
margin requirement for non-cleared trades increases their cost, reflecting the inherently 
high credit risk of bilateral derivatives contracts. This is hoped to move trading to 
products that are suitable for central clearing. (Bank of International Settlements 
2013c, 2) Financial institutions might need as much as 6.7 trillion U.S. dollars in addi-
tional collateral to comply with new bank capital rules and swaps-clearing mandates. 
(Bloomberg 2013b) 
 
8.5.1 Principles of margin requirements 
The regulators have outlined eight key principles for the use of margins.   
 
Suitable margining processes should be in place for all derivatives contracts that are 
not cleared by a central counterparty clearing house. (Bank of International Settlements 
2013c, 4) 
 
Financial institutions and systemically important non-financial institutions that engage 
in non-centrally cleared derivatives contracts must exchange initial and variation mar-
gin. Margin is calculated from the counterparty credit risk posed by the contracts. 
(Bank of International Settlements 2013c, 4) 
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The methodology for calculating the potential future exposure (initial margin) and cur-
rent exposure (variation margin) should be consistent across entities covered by the 
requirements. The calculations must ensure that the risk exposure for the portfolio of 
derivatives is fully covered by margins. (Bank of International Settlements 2013c, 4) 
 
The assets used for margin should be highly liquid and should be able to hold their 
value in time of a financial crisis. This is needed so that assets collected as collateral can 
be liquidated in a reasonable time to generate proceeds that protect the collecting entity 
in the event of counterparty default. (Bank of International Settlements 2013c, 4)  
 
Initial margin has to be exchanged by both parties, without netting of amounts, and 
held in such a way that the collected margin is immediately available to the collecting 
party in the event of counterparty default and that the posting party is fully protected 
in the event that the collecting party enters bankruptcy. (Bank of International Settle-
ments 2013c, 4) 
 
Derivatives contracts between a company and its affiliates should be subject to regula-
tion consistent with each jurisdictions regulatory and legal framework. (Bank of Inter-
national Settlements 2013c, 4) 
 
In order to ensure consistent and non-duplicative regulatory margin requirements, reg-
ulators across jurisdictions must interact with each other’s. (Bank of International Set-
tlements 2013c, 4) 
 
To limit transition cost and allow for establishment of proper regulatory framework, 
the margin requirements must be phased in over an appropriate period. Regulators 
must undertake a coordinated review of margin standards in order to assess the overall 
efficiency of margining and to ensure harmonization across jurisdictions. (Bank of In-
ternational Settlements 2013c, 4) 
 
Variation margin requirements will apply in Europe for non-cleared trades starting 
from 1.12.2015. Initial margin requirements will be phased in between 1.12.2015 and 
1.12.2019. (Bank of International Settlements 2013c, 23) Non-systemically important 
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non-financial institutions will be exempt from posting margin on non-cleared transac-
tions. This does not mean that they bare no expenses for the margining requirement.  
Derivatives dealers will face funding and capital costs from entering into non-
collateralized trades and may pass some or all of these costs onto their customers. (IS-
DA 2014f, 4) 
 
8.5.2 Criticism concerning initial margin 
Regulation mandating margin payments for non-cleared OTC derivatives has im-
portant implication for financial risk management, the financial markets and the global 
economy. The proposed regulatory reform of non-cleared OTC derivatives could un-
favorably affect the use of non-cleared products and negatively impact the economy. 
(ISDA 2013b, 5) 
 
The percentage of cleared interest rate swaps has grown rapidly over the last decade. 
This growth is destined to continue until upwards of 70% of global OTC derivative 
transactions are cleared.  The remaining non-cleared part of the OTC derivatives mar-
ket will remain important to the global economy. They are used by corporations, in-
vestment and pension funds, governments and financial institutions to run their busi-
ness and to manage risk. The cost associated with regulatory proposals regarding mar-
gin requirements for non-cleared trades are a significant threat to the functioning of 
non-cleared OTC derivatives market.  (ISDA 2013b, 3) 
 
Several large OTC derivatives market segments, including most of interest rate swap-
tions and options, cross-currency swaps, single-name credit default swaps and multiple 
types of equity and commodity swaps, will likely remain non-cleared. They do not fit 
the eligibility requirements of clearinghouses. (ISDA 2013b, 4) 
 
Above mentioned and many other non-cleared OTC derivatives have a vital role in risk 
management that cannot be filled by clearable instruments? If derivatives users are 
forced to abandon non-cleared trades and replace them with imperfect or unsuitable 
hedges using only cleared instruments, they might be exposed to unwanted basis risk. 
As a result, user may reject their hedging strategy altogether and remain exposed to 
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financial risk they previously were able to hedge. Even worse would be if companies 
preferred not to take the underlying financial risk in the first place which could have a 
dampening effect on economic growth. (ISDA 2013b, 5) 
 
The margin framework for non-cleared derivatives consists of two elements: variation 
and initial margin. Many OTC derivatives transactions already currently involve the 
payment of variation margin. Like explained in the collateralization chapter, variation 
margin is a tool that is used to avoid the build-up of unsecured risk between trade 
counterparties. Valuation margin is posted as a trade’s market value changes, basically a 
daily settlement or collateralization of amounts owed. ISDA survey from end of De-
cember 2012 showed that more than 70% of all OTC derivatives contacts were subject 
to variation margin calls. (ISDA 2013b, 8) The same survey sampled as of end of De-
cember 2013 showed that approximately 91% of all OTC derivatives contracts were 
subject to margin agreements. (ISDA 2014g, 3) 
 
History has proven that frequently settling unrealized market value changes between 
two parties using variation margin is an effective way to reduce counterparty credit 
risk. The situation with initial margin is problematic. Initial margin is a safety barrier 
used to cover replacement costs if a counterparty defaults. It is an additional payment 
done between counterparties of a trade in excess of amounts owed. Posting initial mar-
gin improves the situation of the non-defaulting party and reduces default contagion 
but the gains come with high costs. Requirement to post initial margin can greatly 
strain the liquidity and financial resources of the posting party. The strain could cause 
the posting party to default. Therefore, initial margin requirement may introduce a po-
tentially large amount of risk to the financial system. The good thing with initial margin 
is that only the defaulting party ends up paying for the costs of the default. (ISDA 
2013b, 8) 
 
Mandating the use of initial margin has benefits, but they come at a huge cost. Regula-
tors must weigh the benefits in relation to the costs involved. The estimated cost of the 
mandatory initial margin, could run to multiple trillions of U.S. dollars (ISDA 2013b, 9) 
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The regulatory treatment of non-cleared OTC derivatives must be based on their un-
derlying risk characteristics as well as on their significant uses. Proposals that signifi-
cantly increase their costs could have significant unwanted consequences on economic 
and financial market activity. (ISDA 2013b, 22) 
 
Over 85% of repliers to an ISDA derivatives end user survey say that being able to use 
OTC derivatives for their risk management purposes is either important or very im-
portant. It is clear that the demand for OTC derivatives remains strong even while 
regulation gets tighter. (ISDA 2014e) 
 
The chairman of International Swaps and Derivatives Association Stephen O’Connor 
summarizes the opinion of the financial industry on regulation that makes OTC trad-
ing more difficult.  
“As the OTC derivatives market continues to evolve amidst significant changes, 
it is clear that end-users around the world want and need the ability to use these 
instruments to manage the risks arising from their business and financing activi-
ties. ISDA is committed to ensuring that this most important of constituencies 
continues to realize the benefits of OTC derivatives by working with them and 
with global policymakers to build safe, efficient markets.” (ISDA 2014d) 
 
8.6 Credit risk mitigation techniques 
EMIR regulation puts in place a number of smaller credit risk mitigation techniques. 
These mainly govern the way trade counterparts should exchange trade documentation 
and reconcile their trading books.  
 
8.6.1 Portfolio reconciliation under EMIR 
Portfolio reconciliation is one of the credit risk mitigation techniques that EMIR intro-
duces. Before a financial and a non-financial counterparty enter into an OTC trade, 
they are mandated to agree in writing, how they will reconcile the portfolio of trades 
between them. (Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) No 149/2013) 
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The reason for performing the portfolio reconciliation is to identify at an early stage 
any possible discrepancies in the economic terms of the OTC derivative contract. (Ar-
ticle 13(3) of Regulation (EU) No 149/2013) The counterparties of the OTC contract 
can use the services of third party vendors to perform the trade reconciliation.  
 
In order to make sure that the portfolio reconciliation is a proportionate risk mitigation 
tool, the frequency of the portfolio reconciliation should be different based on the size 
of the portfolio. More demanding reconciliation requirements will apply to both finan-
cial counterparties and non-financial counterparties that exceed a set clearing thresh-
old. Lower requirements will apply to non-financial counterparts that do not exceed 
the set clearing threshold. (Article 1(29) of Regulation (EU) No 149/2013) 
 
8.6.2 Timely confirmation under EMIR 
Those OTC derivatives contracts that cannot be centrally cleared have to be confirmed 
with trade counterpart in a timely manner (Regulation (EU) No 149/2013). The new 
EU regulation states that it is essential that the terms of a derivatives contract are con-
firmed as soon as possible following the execution of said contract. This is especially 
important if the contract is electronically executed. The reason for the confirmation is 
to ensure a common understanding and legal certainty of the terms of the contract. 
(Regulation (EU) No 149/2013) 
 
8.6.3 Portfolio compression under EMIR 
Another European risk mitigation technique is called portfolio compression. Portfolio 
compression can be an efficient risk mitigation tool depending on the portfolio size, 
maturity, purpose and degree of standardization of OTC derivatives contracts. (Article 
1(30) of Regulation (EU) No 149/2013) Financial and non-financial counterparties 
that have a portfolio of more than 500 outstanding bilateral OTC contracts must estab-
lish procedures to analyze the possibility to conduct a portfolio compression exercise. 
The exercise reduces counterparty credit risk. (Article 14(1) of Regulation (EU) No 
149/2013 
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Banks are already using portfolio compression to decrease their derivatives exposures 
and shrink balance sheets. This is done in order to comply with Basel III ahead of 
time. Portfolio compression can be done with the assistance of third party vendors like 
TriOptima. Their triReduce service has been in use since 2003. (Reuters 2013) Portfo-
lio compression is conducted in the interest rate swap market. Compression gives swap 
dealers, with considerable pay and receives swap activity, a tool to terminate large 
amounts of offsetting contracts before their maturity. The benefits of portfolio com-
pression include reductions in credit risk exposure and operational risk. Also as con-
tracts are eliminated, capital cost can be reduced. (ISDA 2012, 1) 
 
In a portfolio reconciliation exercise, a number of swap dealers aim to eliminate trades 
where the risk of those trades offset one another. Swap dealers provide the compres-
sion vendor a list of their trades and the parameters on how much the compression 
can affect the trade portfolio’s interest rate risk. The vendor compiles the parameters 
from the participants and fully or partially terminates the offsetting trades involved in 
the exercise. (ISDA 2012, 2) 
 
8.7 The value of over the counter derivatives market 
The derivatives reform program has mobilized the financial industry to defend the use 
of over the counter derivatives. The defense is based on the flexibility over the counter 
derivatives offer in comparison to exchange traded derivatives. The key talking points 
of the industry are: 
- There are not always suitable exchange traded derivatives available to replace 
over the counter hedges  
- Over the counter hedges can be more effective and efficient as compared to ex-
change-traded alternatives 
- Over the counter hedges can reduce earnings per share volatility as compared to 
the exchange-traded alternatives  
- Marking to market and the resulting margin requirements can impact the liquid-
ity of non-financial firms and increase costs of operations 
- Exchange-traded derivatives can lead to increased ineffectiveness and as a result 
the hedge might not qualify for FAS 133 hedge accounting 
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(ISDA 2014f, 51) 
 
It is not just the financial industry that has moved to defense positions. In the USA, 
traders have been reporting derivatives transactions to trade repositories and have been 
required to use central counterparty clearing houses since 2013, while European regula-
tors are still defining their requirements. Alan Haywood, an executive in BP Plc criti-
cizes the market fragmentation the Group of Twenty reform has created. He said “As 
an international company working with international counterparties, we want regula-
tion to be pretty consistent worldwide.” (Bloomberg 2014c) 
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9 Conclusions 
The aim of the reforms initiated by the Group of Twenty in 2009 was to reduce sys-
temic risk in the financial market. The regulators in European Union have spent the 
following years implementing regulation that follows the principles set out in the re-
form program. Initially the derivatives reform program consisted of following princi-
ples: 
 All standardized OTC derivatives should be traded on exchanges or electronic 
platforms, where appropriate.  
 All standardized OTC derivatives should be cleared through central counterpar-
ties (CCPs).  
 OTC derivative transactions should be reported to trade repositories.  
 
In 2011, the Group of Twenty supplemented their 2009 reforms with a request for 
regulators to devise proposals to improve margin arrangements in the non-cleared 
OTC derivatives market. 
 
European legislators have implemented or are in the process of implementing all of the 
Group of Twenty derivatives reform principles. Some of the regulation is part of Eu-
ropean Market Infrastructure Regulation EMIR and some are regulated in revised rules 
for Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID/MiFIR). On top of the Group 
of Twenty reforms, European regulators have also implemented additional systemic 
risk mitigation actions. These are the requirement to perform portfolio reconciliation 
with trade counterparts, the requirement to confirm trades in timely manner and to 
perform portfolio compression exercises. The regulation meeting the requirement that 
all standardized OTC derivatives should be cleared on exchanges or electronic plat-
forms is far from being completed. It will be part of MiFIR regulation that is not ex-
pected to be in place before late 2016 or early 2017. 
 
9.1 Trade reporting 
The confusion causes by the broad scope of European trade reporting mandate is 
threatening to undermine the original Group of Twenty commitment to bring safety 
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and transparency to the financial system. Trade repositories have said that most coun-
terparties are sending data into repositories but the whole point of reporting is that 
trade repositories must capture 100% of derivatives trades for central banks to have a 
proper view on systemic risk.  
 
European derivatives users bear a larger regulatory burden than that faced under paral-
lel U.S. regulation. The U.S. Dodd-Frank act places reporting requirement on swap 
dealers and it does not extend to exchange traded deals. The regulators in Europe 
chose to start with a big bank where all derivative counterparts must report all their 
trades starting at the same time. Most financial institutions adapted to the regulation 
pretty quickly but much of the corporate world has not yet come onboard.  
 
The scope of the European regulation makes it very difficult for the authorities to rec-
oncile the vast amounts of trade data. The dual reporting rules that mandates even 
small companies to report their trades, extends the amount of possible reporting enti-
ties to over a million. In comparison the U.S. reporting regulation only affected 25 
largest swap dealers in the first wave of implementation.  
 
The vast amount of affected corporations and the lack of common way to identify 
counterparts made reporting mandate implementation very hard. The technical stand-
ards for trade reporting in Europe were published in December 2012. It was an ambi-
tious goal that the financial industry would have time to develop the needed legal entity 
identifier and assign it to over a million entities before reporting start date 12.2.2014. It 
is clear that the regulators themselves were also struggling under the reporting imple-
mentation. Like mentioned earlier the last instructions by European Securities and 
Market Authority on trade reporting were given to the markets as late as six hours be-
fore the mandatory reporting began. Quite surprisingly the European regulators are 
satisfied with the way reporting started in Europe. Their opinion is in stark contrast to 
the financial industry’s opinion. 
 
Political decisions also played a part in the poor start to reporting. The regulators re-
sponsible for the creation of the reporting standards asked politicians to postpone the 
reporting of exchange traded derivatives by a year. This would have given the regula-
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tors more time to prepare better reporting rules. Unfortunately the European Commis-
sion ignored the opinion of their own regulatory experts. Trade reporting also stum-
bled on mistakes done in previous legislation. The lack of common definition for de-
rivatives can be directly linked to the way that the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive MiFID was implemented in European Union member states.  
 
The poor start for trade reporting has two negative effects. First of all it creates an illu-
sion of market transparency. The regulators have access to massive amounts of trade 
data but according to major trade repositories, the data quality is subpar. In a best case 
situation the trade data is difficult to use for regulators but in a worst case scenario 
they might make ill-informed decisions based on poor quality data.  
 
The financial industry and derivatives end users have spent huge amounts of money 
and time to comply with the regulation. Unfortunately that investment seems to be 
paying less dividends than expected. The sheer amount of work needed to comply with 
sometimes poorly implemented and complex regulation triggers a completely new kind 
of operational risk. The employees who normally would be monitoring risk have often 
been moved to prepare for the post crisis regulation. This means that the core function 
of risk monitoring can get compromised.  
 
The promise behind the Group of Twenty reforms was to create global market trans-
parency and monitoring tools for regulators. The reporting mandate in Europe has so 
far failed to deliver on that promise.  
 
9.2 Clearing obligation 
The use of central counterparty clearing houses is nothing new in the over the counter 
derivatives markets. The benefits that can be gained from lowered counterparty credit 
risk have been utilized by the market for years. The fact that the cleared trades of 
Lehman Brothers were closed out in 2008 without expenses to other clearing members 
is a testament to the effectiveness of central clearing.  
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The European clearing obligation mandates the use of central counterparty clearing 
houses for certain standardized products. These products have not yet been specified. 
The way that the regulation has been written has caused a major pricing problem in the 
OTC market. A concept called frontloading makes it very difficult to price interest rate 
swaps up until the moment when the regulators publish technical standards for clear-
ing.  
 
This is a risk that was raised by the financial industry way in advance but the European 
Securities and Market Authority failed to act before the risk materialized. Now politi-
cians, regulators and financial industry are scrambling to find a solution that is political-
ly and financially acceptable.  
 
The obligation to use central counterparty clearing houses might in a worst case sce-
nario be a big source of systemic risk. The credit risk normally faced by trade counter-
parts is bundled into risk in a clearing house. If something catastrophic were to happen 
to one of the central counterparty clearing houses, the ripple effect would be felt 
throughout the financial system. The fall of individual banks or insurance companies 
would be small in comparison to a central counterparty clearing house defaulting. Rob-
ert Lee the head of systemic risk management of Deutsche bank jokingly spoke in 2013 
ISDA Annual General Meeting in Singapore about the disaster that would result if a 
CCP defaulted. The crowd, including the thesis author, laughed but it is certain that no 
one would be laughing if it happened in real life. 
 
Many end users of derivatives question the whole need for the clearing obligation. On-
ly a small percentage sees clearing as an effective way to combat systemic risk. To the 
contrary a growing number of buy side derivatives users fear the risk of a central coun-
terparty clearing house going down.  
 
9.3 Margin requirements 
The practice of posting variation margin with OTC trade counterparts is a historically 
proven way to limit credit risk in derivatives. Derivatives master agreements have been 
supplemented for years with credit support annexes where trade counterparts agree to 
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post daily collateral to offset the changes in the valuation of bilateral derivatives con-
tracts i.e. variation margin. The latest ISDA margin survey showed a significant in-
crease in the use of variation margin during the last year.  
 
The upcoming European regulation would mandate the posting of variation margin 
and initial margin for trades that are not eligible for central clearing. The financial in-
dustry sees the initial margin requirement to be a danger to the global economy be-
cause it could make hedging of financial risk difficult in the future. In order to hedge 
financial risk with a non-clearable trade, a derivatives user must be willing to post a 
large initial margin to their counterpart. Posting initial margin would cause a strain to 
the financial situation of the posting counterpart. As an option, derivatives users 
should either use clearable instruments that do not always properly match the underly-
ing financial risk i.e. they contain basis risk or forgo hedging completely. In a worst 
case scenario the company might decide not to even perform the activities that are the 
cause of the financial risk. This would mean a decrease in overall economic activity. All 
mentioned options are highly undesirable.  
 
9.4 To conclude 
At this point it is hard to say anything certain about the effectiveness of the European 
regulation. What can be said is that the implementation has not gone as well as it 
should have. Mandatory trade reporting and clearing obligation have both faced diffi-
culties during implementation. The requirement for margin payments on un-cleared 
trades has the potential to have negative impact on the possibility to hedge financial 
risk. What is more alarming than the problems in implementation is the fact that the 
corporations using over the counter derivatives to hedge their risks disagree with regu-
lators about the importance of the derivatives reform.  
 
The financial industry seems to be increasingly worried about the reforms. ISDA pub-
lished four separate studies and one derivatives user survey in April 2014 supporting 
the use of over the counter derivatives. The headlines in the financial news papers dur-
ing ISDA’s annual general meeting in April 2014 were filled with defense for over the 
counter derivatives and warnings to regulators about the impact of regulation. In fact 
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the discussion topics of ISDA’s annual general meeting were all related to the deriva-
tives market reform. It is easy to claim that the financial industry just wants to defend 
its products but they seem to be genuinely worried about the impact of the reforms in 
global economy. 
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10 Additional research topics 
Although the cost of over the counter derivatives trading is perceived to be increasing 
as a result of the Group of Twenty reform program, the OTC market has not fallen 
out of favor: 85.9% of respondents to a 2014 ISDA survey said OTC derivatives are 
important or very important to their risk management. Approximately 64% of re-
spondents believed their use of OTC derivatives would stay the same and 14.8% said it 
would increase. (Risk.net 2014f) This indicates that derivatives users are willing to con-
tinue using OTC derivatives even though regulators try to push trading to exchanges 
and to central clearing. It would be interesting to study how trading habits change 
overtime as a result of regulation. 
 
One topic that keeps appearing in financial news is global market fragmentation. The 
fact that local jurisdiction were left to implement the reform program on their own has 
created very different styles of regulation. It would be interesting to study what kind of 
impact different rules in different geographical areas have on the global economy.  
 
It is certain that regulators, financial institutions and academics will in the future study 
how the regulation has succeeded in limiting systemic risk. The topic would be an in-
teresting follow-up for this thesis. There should be ample research material available 
once the current trade reporting problems are solved. One could hope that future stud-
ies might even result in a commonly accepted definition for systemic risk. 
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